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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Reason for the Study 
The political, economic, and demographic fibers of 
American society have significantly changed since World War 
II. -However, society's quest for free, quality public 
education has remained a constant throughout this current 
period of cultural reformation. This cycle of democratic 
society has again thrust education to the forefront. As a 
political agenda item and a national priority, this renewed 
focus has given the educational community the attention and 
permission needed to induce dramatic and progressive change 
and to aggressively pursue credible school improvement 
research (Tecker, 1985). Society's implication is not that 
the state of education in America is necessarily substandard, 
rather, the education community is being asked to be 
responsive to the technological, cultural, societal, and 
global interdependent changes needed. Thus, current 
educational improvement serves to illustrate the continual, 
evolutionary process of education and is a means to an end 
toward global and domestic societal improvement. 
Perhaps the most common and motivating theme in the 
school reform movement of the 1980s and 1990s is 
accountability. Accountability has been generally defined as 
schools and school personnel being held responsible for 
meeting the expectations and demands of students, parents, 
business and industry, special interest groups, government. 
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higher education, and other constituencies they serve. The 
lack of public confidence caused the national reform reports 
to examine school accountability with responses encouraging 
community-imposed reforms (Brandt, 1990). Chubb and Moe 
(1990) believe that schools have always been held accountable 
through legislated rules, policies, reporting requirements, 
and regulations governing personnel and expenditures of money, 
but the focus of accountability has shifted to each school's 
ability to guarantee that students learn a more rigorous 
curriculum. And in this reformist atmosphere, accountability 
is the catalyst of academic excellence substantiated by a 
public's demand for concrete evidence of results. 
With the help of the state's Supreme Court, Kentucky's 
Éducation Reform Act of 1990 has helped to redefine 
accountability. Accountability is the process of teaching and 
assessing the state mandated outcomes, and the degree of 
school effectiveness attained. School effectiveness is the 
proportion of students meeting the outcomes; school "quality" 
will be measured by test results and publicly scrutinized 
(Foster, 1991). Tecker (1985, p.5) defines school 
accountability, politically, as 
An increasingly well-educated and sophisticated 
public continues to voice its expectations. . 
The public knows intellectually—and personally—the 
positive results of educational success and the 
negative consequences of educational failure. It is 
no wonder that significant public support results in 
the public demanding its money's worth. 
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Glickman (1990) offers a new working definition of 
accountability and asserts that a new accountability can be a 
healthy compromise between the two extremes that have beset 
education over the past two decades. He explains 
historically, the pendulum swung from the excessive left, the 
mid '60s and early '70s exemplified by "open", project- and 
student-centered education, to the extreme right, categorized 
by legislated learning, testing, and "academic excellence." 
Education currently finds itself in the midst of two 
contradictory movements: the legislative reform and the 
empowering reform. He suggests that combining the successes 
of each period into two fixed frames will create a new 
balanced movement of the 1990s. By establishing two pillars, 
equal access to knowledge and public demonstration of results, 
educators can respond to a new accountability characterized by 
shared governance, choice, responsibility, and student 
performance. 
Every level of the education profession has been included 
in the public's scrutiny of the programs and processes by 
which children ultimately are educated. Proactive and 
responsible school districts continue to respond to 
accountability issues and community expectations by 
implementing educational systems that are well grounded in 
current school effectiveness research often resulting in 
school improvement measures and innovative change. It is 
concluded that incentive pay programs can be both an internal 
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(community and school district imposed) and an external 
(legislated) form of school accountability (Carnegie Forum on 
Education and the Economy, 1986; Brandt, 1990; Cetron & Gayle, 
1991). Additionally, the evaluation system implemented to 
support the incentive pay plan will hold teachers and 
administrators accountable for the students' education. 
Aggressive research projects focusing on successful 
schools have identified a myriad of variables that affect 
student growth, school climate, and staff improvement. Some 
predominant characteristics that have surfaced throughout many 
of the school effectiveness efforts and which are 
interdependent on the success and improvement of the school 
unit have included: 
-an orderly and safe environment; 
-clearly articulated mission for the school and district; 
-strong instructional leadership within the management 
structure of the school system; 
-high expectations for students and staff; 
-collegiality demonstrated by (1) talking about teaching, 
(2) observing each other, (3) working on curriculum, and 
(4) teaching each other; 
-sound classroom instructional practices; 
-accurate, disaggregated analysis of assessment results 
of students' work; 
-school autonomy from external bureaucratic influence; 
-supportive, school-wide climate for students to learn 
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and staff to professionally grow; 
-emphasis on basic skills; and 
-increased time on task (Edmonds, 1979; Lightfoot, 1983; 
Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory, 1984; Abrams, 
1985; Lezotte & Bancroft, 1985; Stedman, 1987; Earth, 
1990; Chubb & Moe, 1990). 
These common school improvement correlates provide a 
justification for inducing changes needed within governing 
board policies, teaching and assessing methodologies, and 
perhaps most importantly, management and administrative 
procedures. Considering these recurring factors, education in 
the 1990s is ripe for the marriage of renewed management 
strategies and solidly researched educational methodologies. 
Many school districts are redefining their infrastructure 
by implementing better organizational and management practices 
that have long been successful in the private sector. School 
system restructuring advocates agree that incentive pay is an 
area worth serious consideration (Frase, Hetzel, & Grant, 
1982; Cavanaugh & Yoder, 1984). As demonstrated by the 
private sectors of business and industry, incentive plan 
systems represent a viable and proven management strategy 
(Rumery, 1985; Wood & Green, 1985). Incentive pay plans used 
in tandem with other organizational/management strategies such 
as Management by Objectives (M.B.O.), Quality Circles, 
Site/Building, Project or Management Teams, Site-based 
Management, and Cross-functional Training are management tools 
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found in today's successful companies and applicable to school 
systems (Deal & Kennedy, 1982; Wood & Green, 1985; Herman, 
1989). 
The management of the education system is continually 
being compared to business and industry management. By using 
business and industry management as a model. President Reagan 
initiated support for incentive pay for teachers at the 
national level of government. President Reagan's National 
Commission on Excellence in Education (1983) report, A Nation 
At Risk, supports the implementation of merit pay systems. In 
a commencement address to the graduates of Seton Hall 
University (1983, p.2), the President said 
Teachers should be paid and promoted on the basis of 
their merit and competence,. . .. Hard-earned tax 
dollars should encourage the best. They have no business 
rewarding incompetence and mediocrity. 
The merit pay issue is not strictly a conservative agenda 
item. Congressman Carl Perkins, a Democrat from Kentucky and 
chairman of the House Education Committee, established a House 
Task Force on Merit Pay for Teachers. The purpose was to 
establish a model teacher incentive plan (Perkins, 1984). 
There are three compelling reasons for the education 
community to implement incentive plans. First is the 
immediate and long-term need for an increased teacher work 
force (English, 1984; Darling-Hammond, 1986). Second, the 
implementation of effective schools research coupled with 
school accountability requires improvements in the quality and 
professionalization of teaching; incentive plans relate 
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teacher performance to evaluation standards (Cresap, 
McCormick, & Paget, 1984). Finally, incentive plans provide 
the necessary management structure aW processes needed to 
improve the administration of the district and the 
implementation of other school improvement efforts; incentive 
plans can provide the vehicle by which a sound evaluation 
system and a supportive staff development program can be 
implemented (Robinson, 1983). 
Statement of the Problem 
The use of incentive pay/pay for performance is a 
controversial trend that is quickly making its way onto 
America's current educational agenda. It is the focus of many 
public interest groups, teacher unions, school districts, 
state legislatures, private institutions, and government 
agencies, all of which perceive merit pay in some way 
affecting the quality of education and thus teacher and school 
accountability (Hawley, 1985; Tecker, 1985; Glickman, 1990). 
Effective schools researchers have identified many factors 
that significantly promote improved schooling for all children 
(Brookover & Lezotte, 1977; Edmonds, 1979; Northwest Regional 
Educational Laboratory, 1984; Stedman, 1987; Barth, 1990). 
Educational reformers are aggressively implementing 
restructured policies and processes that they hope will 
influence the quality of the education system. 
Merit pay can be a major consideration that supplements the 
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political factors driving the policy changes of education; but 
perhaps as important, it can serve as a catalyst for a 
renaissance for the teaching profession (Anderson & Mark, 
1985; Flannelly & Palaich, 1985; Inman, 1985; Turner et al., 
1986). 
Because of the nature of this study, the statement of the 
problem and, thus, questions posed are not intended to 
generate the hypotheses to be tested statistically. It is the 
intent of this study to (1) provide the rationale and 
justification for the development of a performance-based pay 
plan model, (2) develop the model, and (3) using synthetic 
data, hypothetically analyze the cost of the model in terms of 
teacher compensation. 
The following questions more succinctly define the 
problem: 
a. Does the influence of the current political climate, 
professionalization of teaching, and/or the apparent 
teacher shortage warrant the implementation of 
performance-based pay plans? 
b. What variables should be included in a comprehensive pay 
for performance plan? 
c. Can a comprehensive merit pay plan model be developed that 
represents current effective schools research, 
motivation theory, and sound pedagogy? 
d. How should the factors selected for inclusion in a merit 
pay plan model be weighted? 
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e. How should the pay for performance plan algorithms be 
developed to provide for a balanced, yet properly 
distributed, comprehensive model? 
f. What legal, motivational, and/or procedural considerations 
should be included in a merit pay plan model? 
g. What is the possible cost of compensation the district may 
incur using different percents of salary and varying the 
number of teachers qualifying? 
Purpose of Study 
The primary purpose of this study is to develop a 
comprehensive merit pay plan that (1) incorporates current 
effective schools pedagogy, (2) integrates a total systems 
approach to personnel evaluation, (3) provides for teachers' 
due process and program validity, (4) presents well-balanced, 
equitable, and multi-dimensional weighted algorithms, and (5) 
provides a model that discriminates between levels of teacher 
competency and performance. Specifically, a pay for 
performance paradigm and supporting implementation procedures 
will be developed based on a hypothetical school district's 
teacher evaluation philosophy, procedures, and policies. 
The second purpose of this study is to examine the cost 
of this merit pay plan solely in the context of differentiated 
compensation, or the dollar amount realized for merit pay per 
individual teacher results. Using a total systems approach to 
personnel evaluation (Manatt & Stow, 1986) as the model's 
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infrastructure, a cost analysis matrix will be developed to 
demonstrate the financial impact and feasibility of 
implementing the merit pay plan. The matrix will represent 
the differentiated levels of teacher experience, district 
staining, and varying possibilities of results of the 
teachers' composite score as a function of the model•s 
algorithms. 
Ultimately, this study will provide a model from which 
school districts can develop a merit pay plan. Districts will 
determine how to implement a teacher evaluation system, reward 
quality teaching, provide staff development opportunities, and 
establish the rate of compensation. This study is designed to 
promote the use of merit pay plans and initiate the further 
study of the individual factors included in this model as to 
their validity, influence, and contribution toward effecting 
teacher motivation and performance, and student achievement. 
The implementation of such a model and the demonstration of 
the feasibility of the plan could assist local school 
districts in the development of a plan and help predict the 
financial impact. 
Assumptions 
This study was based on the following parameters: 
a. The Teacher Performance Evaluation system used is based on 
the School Improvement Model research of the last ten 
years, and the model school district has implemented the 
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Teacher Performance Evaluation system consistent with 
School Improvement Model projects protocol. 
The model school district would have a valid and reliable 
K~12 Criterion-Referenced Test battery for all disciplines 
in use. 
The model school district would implement the use of a 
Student Feedback Questionnaire. 
Issues commonly negotiated by teachers* unions such, as 
class size, compensation ranges, and student test gains 
criteria will be assumed to be pre-established by the 
individual school districts, and represented levels for 
this study are only hypothetical in nature. 
Delimitations 
The value of this study lies in the concept of the 
development of the model and that variations to the 
factors and weights are dependent on the individual 
Teacher Performance Evaluation system and the needs of the 
school district. 
The focus of the model is on the individual teacher, 
within the context of the SIM performance appraisal 
system; thus, no school-based incentive factors such as 
school climate indicators or school-wide student 
achievement results will be included. 
This study will not attempt to statistically validate (1) 
the influence or contribution of the individual variables 
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included in the merit pay plan model, or (2) the 
appropriateness of the weights associated with each 
variable within the individual algorithm or within the 
whole plan, or (3) weights assigned to the classification 
of students within the class size variable. 
d. No attempt will be made to assess the validity of this 
plan regarding its influence on student achievement, 
teacher performance, improved classroom instruction, 
teacher motivation, teacher morale, teacher acceptance, 
nor teacher satisfaction. 
e. All demographic data, student and teacher performance 
results, and compensation ranges will be hypothetical and 
synthetically derived. 
f. The feasibility of the merit pay plan model will be 
determined within the context of the financial cost 
associated with the total amount of merit pay 
hypothetically distributed to the district's teachers. 
Outline of Subsequent Chapters 
Because of the developmental nature of this study, the 
format of the following chapters and the methodology warrant 
clarification. The second chapter reviews the literature 
related to teacher supply and demand, incentive plans as 
motivators, and the professionalization of teaching. The 
third chapter will present the performance pay plan including 
the supportive implementation procedures, description of 
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evaluation instruments, and the algorithms with explanations 
and example computations. The fourth chapter will present the 
feasibility study in the form of cost analysis matrices. The 
fifth chapter will summarize the study with conclusions and 
recommendations. 
14 
CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
The difference between $70,000 and $75,000 is a 
difference only in the ego of the player. I had 
made that clear from the beginning. If they didn't 
want to make me feel happy, fine. But they were 
showing me exactly what they thought of me. I was 
an employee and they were my employers. I could 
call them "mister" when we passed in the hallway 
. . . (Koufax, 1966, p.91). 
As somewhat dramatically demonstrated by baseball Hall of 
Famer Sandy Koufax in 1966, compensation in terms of one's 
performance can be the root of dissatisfaction and controversy 
between employee and employer. Whether a professional 
athlete, scientist, physician, teacher, or plumber, the value 
that is assigned an occupation in a democratic society can 
differ from the merit of that job and, likewise, the 
compensation earned by performing the tasks of that job at the 
varying degrees of competence (Lincoln & Cuba, 1980). This 
review of literature will focus exclusively on the teaching 
profession and examine the many factors associated with the 
development of incentive pay plans and more specifically 
performance based pay plans. 
Historic Overview 
Historically, merit pay was the norm early in the 
twentieth century (Kohut & Wright, 1984). As the Depression 
precipitated financial crises for school districts and as 
teachers and administrators struggled to maintain existing 
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levels of school support, merit pay quickly disappeared from 
school systems' budget proposals. Johnson (1984) cites NEA 
surveys that indicated 48 percent of the 309 districts 
surveyed used merit pay to determine salaries in 1918-1919, 33 
percent of 941 school districts in 1923 based-salary on merit, 
and by 1928 only 18 percent determined salaries on merit. Any 
return to merit pay plans again after the depression were 
quickly abandoned with the onset of World War II. Districts 
were faced with trying to maintain a teaching force which was 
depleted by the war effort; men were called to service in the 
armed forces and women pursued higher paying factory jobs. 
The merit pay issue again surfaced in the post-World War 
II era. Because of the large, shift of teachers out of the 
education field during the war, school districts now found 
themselves attempting to shore up and stabilize their 
faculties. Additionally, the post-war years brought our 
nation's first baby boom producing a record number of children 
entering the school system. Merit pay was seen as a possible 
incentive to attract the numbers of teachers needed to staff 
the classrooms (Kohut & Wright, 1984). 
However, in the early 1940s and during the immediate 
post-war era, the teachers' organizations had worked 
diligently to establish and institutionalize the single salary 
schedule. Labor unions were re-establishing themselves 
nationally within the industrial workplace and, likewise, 
teacher unions were being fortified with the increased number 
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of teaching positions. The use of the single salary schedule 
was further justified to end the obvious disparities between 
elementary and secondary school teachers'.salaries, and more 
important, inequity by gender and race (Urban, 1985). This 
plan compensated all teachers based on similar experience and 
training; consequently, the resurgence of merit pay fizzled 
out (Educational Research Service, 1983; Murnane & Cohen, 
1986). Between 1939 and 1953, the.number of school districts 
in cities with populations of more than 30,000 that used merit 
pay fell from 20 percent to 4 percent (Porwoll, 1979). 
The last significant attempt to implement merit pay into 
the educational system was in the early 1960s and was fueled 
by Sputnik (Natriello & Dornbusch, 1984). The space race 
influenced 10 percent of school districts to use some form of 
merit pay in the 1960s (Johnson, 1984). Porwoll (1979) found 
that by 1972 the number of school districts using merit pay 
had fallen to 5.5 percent and a 1978 survey of 11,500 school 
systems netted only 115 merit pay plans. 
As recently as 1983, only 7 percent of Catholic high 
schools reported that they used some form of merit pay 
(National Catholic Education Association, 1985). The 
Educational Research Service (ERS) (1983) found that 6.4 
percent of 3,000 schools surveyed had attempted some form of 
merit pay plan but had terminated them. But the ERS research 
further found that nearly 90 percent of the 3,000 schools in 
their survey had not yet had any experience, good or bad, with 
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any type of incentive pay plan. In fiscal years 1983 and 
1984, the U.S. Education Department funded 71 teacher 
incentive plans in 37 states at a cost of $2.6 million; in 
1984 it awarded over one million dollars to 51 school 
districts for developing and implementing pay-incentive plans 
(Bridgeman, 1984). Bobbitt (1989) found almost two out of 
five (38 percent) of all public schools offered one or more 
teacher incentive programs. According to Cornett in the 
Career Ladder Clearinghouse (1990), the U.S. Department of 
Education's School and Staffing Survey of 1988 found that as 
many as 572,000 or 26 percent of the total 2.2 million public 
school teachers were participating in some incentive pay 
program. Boyer and the Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching (1990) found 31 percent of those 
surveyed participating in some form of an incentive pay 
program with 4 percent in a merit pay program. 
Incentive Pay 
Twenty-five years after Sputnik and responding to demands 
outside of the educational community, school districts were 
again attempting to implement incentive pay plans. This 
latest attempt has found the educational community armed with 
significant research supporting effective teaching 
methodologies, more articulated evaluation systems, and wide­
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spread public support of incentive pay for teachers (McGreal, 
1983; Manatt, Palmer, & Hildebaugh, 1976; Gallup, 1985 and 
1990). 
Proponents argue that incentive plans motivate teachers 
to work harder and better (Frase, Hetzel, & Grant, 1982). 
Wilson (1980) asserts that merit pay "encourages the optimum 
performance of all individuals within an institution." He 
further explains there is little incentive for teachers to 
perform beyond "maintaining" the classroom and to continue to 
reward mediocrity is to undermine the teaching profession. 
Likewise, Burrill (1985) states 
Merit pay, rather, is a method of recognizing and 
rewarding excellence. It is a method for communicating 
that mediocrity will not be tolerated. This is equally 
as important as raising base salaries. 
Lovrich et al. (1980) states "there is inadequate motivation 
because we have too few rewards for excellence anc! too few 
penalties for unsatisfactory work." Cetron and Gayle (1991) 
include merit pay as their fourth of nine recommendations 
cited as necessary for the improvement of our education 
system. Major reports advocate for tying teacher performance 
to increased merit-based compensation (National Commission on 
Excellence in Education, 1983; Carnegie Forum on Education and 
the Economy, 1986; National Governors' Association, 1986; 
California Department of Education, 1990). 
Incentive pay programs can counter the plateauing effect 
that influences all jobs, particularly teaching, in that 
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incentive plans offer opportunities to expand teachers' 
perspectives of what they do and how they do it (Brandt, 
1990). Merit can be seen as a fundamental form of justice 
that exemplifies the economic structure of a democracy. The 
ethics are simple; the harder one works, the better one works, 
the more compensation one should receive beyond their 
colleagues who have failed to reach the same level (Jackson, 
1985). 
Brandt (1990) using industry as a model, believes that 
merit pay communicates the corporate values and receives 
emphasis through explicit criteria, job descriptions, and 
employee evaluation forms. Merit pay effects change in 
industry, and he believes it could aid educators to stimulate 
instructional improvement. A well-conceived merit pay system 
can improve the quality and quantity of production as well as 
morale (Thomsen, 1978; Printz & Waldman, 1985). 
However political it may be to include performance-based 
pay to teachers' salaries, it is necessary to provide merit to 
substantiate a teacher's self-worth. Lack of merit pay sends 
a message to teachers that 
. . .  m y  e m p l o y e r s  l a c k  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c o u r a g e  t o  r e w a r d  
any exceptionally good work that I do. Obviously, they 
don't value the quality that is the source of my self-
esteem, my effectiveness in helping young people to learn 
(Sizer, 1985, p.186). 
Conversely, opponents state that incentive pay plans and 
merit pay specifically are detrimental to the teaching 
profession. Dennis (1982) believes merit pay is 
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"fundamentally dishonest" because the measurement of merit is 
not valid. Likewise, Friedman (1984, p.32) views teaching as 
a calling rather than a means to "material prosperity" and 
merit pay as insulting to the profession, and that "merit pay 
is never offered to people engaged in highly respected 
occupations; they are expected to possess drive and initiative 
independent of salary considerations." Lipsky and Bacharach 
(1982, p.7) conclude 
. . . changing to merit pay is risky, costly, and may 
create more problems than are solved. While no 
compensation strategy is a panacea, the single salary 
schedule is a better plan than merit pay. 
Herdon (1983) offers six reasons why merit pay won't 
work; (1) merit pay systems can institutionalize the 
acceptability of mediocrity and inferiority; (2) merit pay 
systems can be driven more by political than professional 
considerations; (3) merit pay systems can complicate the 
remediation of performance problems among teachers; (4) merit 
pay plans might stifle extra effort; (5) merit pay plans 
require arbitrary comparison and contrast of functions; and 
(6) merit pay plans can induce unpleasant competition within 
faculties. 
Other concerns of opponents include: 
-favoritism and inequity; 
-professionalism will become passe; 
-the process will demoralize staff and be divisive; 
-merit pay can stifle extra effort; 
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-lack of validity for performance measurements; and 
-reliability of supervisor's appraisal (Lawler, 1971; 
Dennis, 1982; Burnside, 1985). 
Hawley (1985) believes that performance pay cannot by 
itself induce significant changes in educational productivity. 
Sergiovanni (1985) maintains that incentive systems will lead 
to destructive competition between teachers and force teachers 
away from increasing internal discipline and self-
responsibility. Murnane & Cohen (1986) conclude that 
"seniority-based employment contracts may be more effective in 
promoting public education than performance-based contracts." 
Additionally, Murnane (1985) uses an economist's model to 
explain that it is difficult to identify the incentives that 
merit pay really provides or to predict how teachers and 
administrators will respond to the incentives. Teacher unions 
are concerned that merit cannot be measured objectively and 
subjective performance evaluation would be at the discretion 
of individual principals (Chubb & Moe, 1990). 
Throughout this discussion, how change is facilitated 
within a formal institution is the driving issue. For a 
program to succeed, the teachers as individuals and 
collectively as the district must be ready for change. 
Sarason (1971) believes this type of major change is highly 
unlikely because educators seldom examine the underlying 
regularities of school as an institution. Such a regularity 
is never comparing teachers in any way; it is seen as 
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subversive. If educational institutions are to change and 
improve, he feels that this type of regularity must change. 
Public and teacher response 
Seventy-five percent of the public responding to the 1984 
Gallup poll support basing teacher salaries on merit. In a 
survey conducted for Newsweek. Eitelberg (1983, p.61) found 80 
percent of the public surveyed favored basing teachers' 
salaries on merit and 60 percent disagreed with the National 
Education Association's point that "it is difficult to 
evaluate teacher performance objectively." 
In the most current survey on the profile of teaching, 
Feistritzer (1990) found 75 percent of teachers surveyed 
agreed that pay for teachers should be based on job 
performance in addition to seniority and level of education. 
As reported in The Condition of Teaching. A State-bv-State 
Analvsis by Boyer (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of 
Teaching, 1990, pp.79-80), teachers were asked, "If you had 
the authority to do what is really necessary to make public 
schools better, how would the following be distributed on your 
priority list: longer school days; somewhat longer school 
year; career ladder program for teachers; mentor-teacher 
program; requiring professional exams or teachers; day care 
for children of teachers; merit pay program; and alternative 
certification routes." Seventy-six percent of respondents 
prioritized the three incentive pay issues in the top four. 
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The American School Board Journal (Rist, 1983) reported 62.7 
percent of a national sample of teachers agreed that teachers 
should be paid according to how well they perform in the 
classroom. Additionally, 61.5 percent and 62.1 percent of 
the affirmative respondents were affiliated with the A.F.T. 
and N.E.A. respectively, with 76.4 percent of non-union 
teachers represented. 
In 1989, the president of the National Education 
Association, Mary Hatwood Futrell, endorsed the Fairfax County 
merit program (Cetron & Gayle, 1991). The American Federation 
of Teachers President Albert Shanker also has softened his 
position on incentive programs to the point of offering a 
model of "incentive schools" for consideration (Shanker, 
1990). 
Incentive Pay Plans 
The current school reform movement, initiated in the 
early 1980s, has forced public schools to be more accountable 
to their community and student population. Toward this end, 
37 state legislatures and numerous local school boards have 
mandated some form of incentive compensation for teachers 
(Cornett, 1988). The variety of extra compensation plans 
range from career ladders to merit pay and mentor teacher 
programs to job enlargement proposals (Educational Research 
Services, 1983; Kapel et al., 1985). 
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For this study, "incentive pay" is used as an umbrella 
term including all the practices that serve to compensate 
teachers beyond the base salary schedule for teaching. Citing 
Brandt's (1990) definitions, the interchangeable terms "merit 
pay" and "pay for performance" will refer to plans that 
compensate teachers, above the base salary, based on the 
quality of performance however judged. Likewise, Hawley 
(1985, p.19) refers to merit pay as "any form of financial 
reward that is tied to higher levels of teacher or student 
performance." Career ladders are plans that feature 
performance exclusively in additional non-teaching areas and 
are usually extra responsibilities required for promotion to 
further steps on the ladder. Career ladders usually 
differentiate the teaching staff into levels or titles. Job 
enlargement refers to plans that require working longer hours 
or additional days, or assuming extra duties such as mentor 
teacher. 
Numerous reasons prohibited previous incentive plans from 
truly increasing the quality of the educational program 
(Cramer, 1983b). The majority of plans have been harnessed 
with non-educational parameters that 1) stifle domestic input 
and ownership and 2) do not adequately address current 
elements of effective schools research. Few plans have 
research-based pedagogical criteria that can be evaluated 
either as a causal effect of school improvement efforts or the 
influence of teachers' motivation and attitudes toward the 
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incentive plan. The most prevalent compensation model, 
currently used for approximately 99 percent of public school 
teachers, is solidly grounded in a single salary schedule that 
solely pays teachers for years of experience and professional 
or academic units completed (Calhoun & Protheroe, 1983; 
Murnane & Cohen, 1986). These plans offer little true 
incentive for the observably better teaching and increased 
student learning. 
Rhodes (1973) found 12 basic flaws in merit pay plans 
that did not succeed: 
-insufficient discrimination among teachers; 
-artificial cutoffs on the number of teachers to receive 
merit pay; 
-poor evaluators; 
-mistaken concepts by board members and administrators; 
-lack of clearly understood goals; 
-lack of clear definition of the job; 
-lack of priorities in the teachers' job; 
-lack of effective evaluation instruments; 
-inability to measure teacher and student results; 
-inability to translate evaluation into improved 
instruction; 
-inadequate financial incentives; and 
-too limited concept of merit, more elements in the plan. 
Current incentive plans tend only to use one factor to 
evaluate teachers' effectiveness and, thus, lack in the 
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program breadth needed for significant school and district 
improvement. Brandt (1990, p.34) concludes that merit pay 
plans should include elements from different models. "The 
combination of elements from different models provides an 
eclectic and politically more easily sustained program than 
most single models." With few exceptions, these programs with 
single factors have not directly improved the schools' 
performance nor have they been sustained over a period of time 
with long-term, documented results positively affecting 
student achievement, school climate, or improved 
professionalism (Frase et al., 1982). Current incentive plans 
are modeled after existing systems that produce a diluted and 
differentiated meritorious compensation plan. Murnane and 
Cohen (1986) found that the most successful incentive programs 
in schools were those that distributed awards evenly; this 
defeats the basic premise of performance-based pay plans—that 
of differentiated rewards objectively based on an individual's 
performance. 
The educational climate is ripe for the implementation of 
a comprehensive pay for performance plan that integrates sound 
pedagogy, current effective schools correlates, proven 
institutional management processes, and that is balanced with 
an accurate evaluation system and union supported 
administrative procedures. The following discussion will 
address the factors considered that warrant the use of 
performance-based pay plans; to increase the teacher work 
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force, to improve the professional image of teaching, to 
justifiably compensate effective teaching, to motivate 
teachers, and to facilitate the improvement of classroom 
teaching methodologies and student learning through an 
effective evaluation system (Sykes, 1983; Educational Research 
Service, 1983; Burden, 1985). 
Teacher Shortage and Recruitment 
Current teacher employment and recruitment research 
provides strong justification for the many reasons the current 
education system needs to provide incentive plans. The 
National Commission on Excellence in Education (1983) found 
three problems that exemplify the teacher shortage: (1) 
teaching fails to attract the most able young people; (2) a 
disproportionate share of the highly able teachers leave 
teaching to pursue careers elsewhere; and (3) most schools 
fail to motivate and support teachers to consistently give 
their best effort. Darling-Hammond (1984, p.iii) states 
. . . dramatic changes in our nation's teaching 
force will soon lead to serious shortages of 
qualified teachers. . .. The currently highly 
educated and experienced teaching force is dwindling 
as older teachers retire in increasing numbers and 
many younger teachers leave for other occupations. 
Teacher demand 
There is a significant dearth of potential teacher 
candidates to fill increasingly greater numbers of teaching 
positions (Anderson & Mark, 1985). Fewer than 5 percent of 
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full-time college freshmen chose teaching as a career in 1982 
as compared with 19 percent in 1970 (Feistritzer, 1986). At 
least one-third of the nation's teachers are 45 years old or 
older, and coupled with the current "baby boomlet", it is 
expected that the demand for new public and private school 
teachers will exceed 2 million teachers during the next 
decade, or 200,000 teachers a year. Estimates range as high 
as 2.5 million, which means that as many teachers are likely 
to be hired within the next ten years as are currently 
teaching today (Bradley, 1990). 
Through the turn of the 21st century, the need for 
teachers will expand by approximately one-half of the current 
staffing in today's schools (Cresap, McCormick, & Paget, 
1984). Presently, some school districts are unable to fill 
vacancies in impacted disciplines with qualified teachers 
(Cresap, McCormick, & Paget, 1984; Engel & Nail, 1984; 
National Governors' Association, 1986; Cetron & Gayle, 1991). 
The survey of school and university placement officials 
reported that 14 of 45 teaching fields suffered from "some 
shortage" of teachers, and "considerable shortage" in the 
areas of bilingual education, special education, physics, 
mathematics, computer science, Spanish, chemistry, and 
counseling (Bradley, 1990). Research indicates that attrition 
rates vary with subject specialization and by the age of the 
teachers when they enter the profession (Murnane, Singer, & 
Willett, 1988). The California Education Summit Final Report 
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(1990) recommended that school systems expand teacher 
recruitment to target minority individuals, encourage mid-
career entrance into teaching, and provide incentives to keep 
outstanding teachers in the profession. It is estimated that 
by 1995, at least 40 percent of the present 200,000 
mathematics and science teachers (who are older on average 
than teachers in other subject areas due to heavy recruitment 
during the Sputnik era) will be retired (Cresap, McCormick, & 
Paget, 1984). The National Governors' Association (1986) 
estimated that by 1991, the demand for new teachers will be 
met with only a 68 percent supply. The Carnegie Forum (1986) 
estimated that between 1986 and 1992, the need for new 
teachers will exceed 1.3 million. 
Current teacher employment studies indicate more veteran 
teachers leaving the profession than new teachers entering or 
re-entering it (Cresap, McCormick, & Paget, 1984; National 
Center for Education Statistics, 1990). A 1986 Metropolitan 
Life Survey (Harris & Associates, 1986) found 27 percent of 
teachers polled stated they would leave the field of education 
within the next five years. The RAND report (Darling-Hammond, 
1984) showed a drastic change in the number of teachers who 
indicated they "would not teach again." The report showed an 
increase of 10 percent from 1970-71 to approximately 38 
percent in 1980-81. In the Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching's The Condition of Teaching (1990), 
Boyer found that only 63 percent of 21,389 teachers surveyed 
30 
planned to teach until they retire. Fifteen percent of the 
3,201 teachers surveyed in the Profile of Teachers in the 
U.S.-1990 (Feistritzer, 1990) stated they would be retired or 
employed in another occupation outside of education within the 
next five years. Additionally, 10 percent of the respondents 
indicated they would be employed in another occupation in 
education. Thus, 25 percent of teachers surveyed may not be 
teaching by 1995 (Feistritzer, 1990). 
Teachers* qualifications 
The public school systems are losing many of the finest 
beginning teachers within their first five years of teaching 
(Cramer, 1983a). And according to Darling-Hammond (1984) of 
the Rand Corporation, the most academically talented teachers 
leave at twice the rate of the less-qualified teachers. 
Although the national teacher turnover rate is consistently 
around 6 percent annually, turnover rates for the initial four 
years of teaching are estimated at 50 to 60 percent (Vance & 
Schlechty, 1982). Another study by Schlechty and Vance 
(1981), indicated that those students with the strongest 
academic backgrounds leave teaching for other pursuits in 
greater numbers than those with weaker backgrounds. 
Feistritzer (1990) found that only 72 percent of teachers 
hired since 1985 plan on teaching five years from 1990. 
The recruitment, retention, and promotion of academically able 
and talented individuals are fundamental goals of the 
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education reform movement. By limiting pay, incentives, and 
rewards for teacher growth, the present system discourages 
young people who respect their own talent from pursuing a 
teaching career (Hart & Murphy, 1986). Underlying the 
development of recent incentive plans is research that 
indicates college students and teachers with the best academic 
qualifications are no longer attracted to teaching or 
interested in making a career of it if they have entered the 
field (Koerner, 1963; Schlechty & Vance, 1981; Weaver, 1984; 
Murnane et al., 1988). 
Dunwell (1986, p.l) finds 
. . . the American public and American education 
appear to have arrived at some kind of agreement 
that the two most critical problems now facing 
teaching are: (1) the lack of teachers with quality, 
educational backgrounds, and (2) the lack of career 
incentives sufficient to retain the most talented 
teachers. 
Rosenholtz and Smylie (1984, p.158) present four points that 
illustrate the current decline in teacher candidates' academic 
qualifications : 
(1) there is a relationship between teachers verbal 
ability and student achievement, (2) there has been 
a decline in the average salary of both beginning 
and experienced teachers as compared to other 
professions, (3) this decline in relative salaries 
has paralleled a decline in the verbal ability of 
teacher candidates and a dramatic decrease in the 
overall numbers of college students aspiring to 
teach and (4) persons who do not choose to teach 
often cite low salaries and low occupational status 
as their reasons. 
Both teachers planning to leave teaching and those who 
actually do leave the profession are more academically able. 
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on the average, than teachers who want to stay in the 
profession (Rosenholtz & Smylie, 1984) . Anderson and Mark 
(1985) delineate a cycle that hampers teacher recruitment; 
low pay drives talented teachers out of the profession and 
makes it difficult to attract high-quality people to teaching 
as a career and, thus, this leads to reduced performance in 
the school system. Subsequently, poor performance erodes 
public confidence which leads to reduced financial support and 
further reductions in teacher salary levels. The Rand report 
(Darling-Hammond, 1984) revealed that teachers with an 
academic major in their field of teaching were more 
dissatisfied than those who may lack a major in their field of 
teaching (in short, those teachers less qualified); the best 
qualified teachers are the most dissatisfied with the 
profession. 
Teachers' salaries 
Rousseau in Emile stated. 
There are callings so noble that one cannot follow them 
for money without proving oneself unworthy of following 
them. Such is that of the man of war; such is that of 
the teacher (p.47). 
Rousseau's idealism certainly is admirable, and perhaps 
altruism or public service are bases for career choice. Yet, 
in such an important, performance-dependent profession as 
teaching is today, it is naive to believe that altruism should 
be a supplemental form of compensation. 
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Low pay is frequently cited by many college students who 
do not choose teaching as a career, and more than 25 percent 
of teachers indicated low salary as the single reason for 
leaving teaching (Duttweiler, 1986; Page & Page, 1982). 
Salaries for entry level teachers are not competitive with 
other employment opportunity markets (Perkins, 1984; 
Feistritzer, 1986). As a comparison, in 1987 the average 
starting salary for an accountant was $21,200; a computer 
specialist earned $26,170; an engineer began at $28,500; as 
compared to a teacher at $17,500 (Cetron & Gayle, 1991). 
Cetron and Gayle also found that in 40 of 50 states, a 
starting garbage collector still earns more than a starting 
teacher. 
The public is overwhelmingly supportive of teacher salary 
increases and, likewise, feel increased salaries would improve 
the quality of education. Fifty percent of respondents think 
teaching salaries are too low, as compared to 33 percent in 
1985. And 79 percent of those surveyed think higher teacher 
salaries would improve school quality (Gallup, 1990). 
The Carnegie Forum in A Nation Prepared; Teachers for the 
21st Centurv (1986, p.35), recognized that "higher teacher pay 
is an absolute prerequisite to attracting, and keeping, the 
people we want in teaching." The crisis in recruiting teacher 
candidates and its relationship to salary is not new. Andrews 
(1987, p.53) quotes a report to the Committee on Education and 
Labor, by President John F. Kennedy (1963) 
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Improved research and teacher training are not 
enough if good teachers do not choose to teach. Yet 
present salary schedules in some cases are too low 
at the start to compete against other positions 
available to college graduates. In almost all 
cases, they are too low at the top to retain our 
ablest young teachers. Without sufficient incentive 
to make teaching a lifetime career, teachers with 
valuable training and experience, but heavy family 
responsibilities, too often become frustrated and drop 
out of the profession. 
Only 51 percent of surveyed teachers said they were 
satisfied with their household income as compared to 69 
percent of the general public in 1988 (National Center for 
Education Information, 1990). Schrag (1983, p.258) contends 
that rewarding excellence in teaching provides an incentive 
for good teachers to continue and for good prospects to enter 
the profession. She states, "any occupation in which merit is 
totally divorced from rewards will fail to attract or retain 
its fair share of creative, dedicated individuals." 
There is a tendency for most salary increases to occur in 
the first third of the teacher's career, within ten to fifteen 
years, and thus by the time a teacher has reached the highest 
salary level and is perhaps at the peak of professional 
competence, there are limited possibilities for salary 
advancement (Schlechty & Vance, 1981). Thus, many experienced 
teachers are opting for second careers or retiring early, 
creating the inevitable teacher shortage (Carnegie.Forum, 
1986). Also, many teachers report taking second jobs in order 
to compensate for low salaries. Nationally, 11.1 percent of 
teachers indicate they were working at two jobs during the 
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school year; the average income is approximately $3,189 
(Boyer, 1983). The Education Commission of the States (1983) 
found that 16.8 percent of all teachers and 22.4 percent of 
high school teachers reported working at outside jobs during 
the previous school year. Boyer (1983)., in his 1982 survey of 
Texas high schools, found 29 percent of the teachers held 
additional jobs during the school year. Bobbitt (1989) of the 
National Center for Education Statistics found that 9.7 
percent of teachers surveyed held down second jobs during the 
entire calendar year. Finally, Cetron and Gayle (1991, p.225) 
have predicted a trend for teachers' salaries. 
Teachers' salaries will continue to be debated in the 
1990s while research regarding the relationship of 
financial incentives to retention of qualified teachers 
continue. Teacher salaries will need to increase by as 
much as $10,000 per teacher if the profession is to be 
able to attract talented individuals with skills 
commensurate to other like professions. 
In summary, John Goodlad in A Place Called School (1984, 
p.116) claims: 
Talk of securing and maintaining a stable corps of 
understanding teachers is empty rhetoric unless serious 
efforts are made to study and remedy the conditions 
likely to drive out those already recruited. 
A well-developed and manageable incentive plan can attract, 
motivate, and retain good teachers (Cresap, McCormick, & 
Paget, 1984). Cramer (1983a) sees merit as a measure for the 
public to attract and keep the good teachers in their schools. 
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Professionalization of Teaching 
Until teaching becomes a more attractive profession, the 
problems of attracting and retaining talented teachers will 
undermine the success of other reforms intended to upgrade 
educational programs and curricula (Darling-Hammond, 1984). 
Educators need to embrace changes that will positively affect 
the perception of teaching as a profession. 
Ten major national reports on education of the 1980s 
supported the issues surrounding the professionalization of 
teaching and monetarily rewarding quality instruction. Along 
with more rigorous credential requirements, these reports 
advocated increased compensation, staff development training, 
and career advancement opportunities (Education Commission of 
the States, 1983; National Commission on Excellence in 
Education, 1983; Task Force on Federal Elementary and 
Secondary Education Policy, 1983; National Association of 
Secondary School Principals and The Commission on Educational 
Issues on the National Independent Schools, 1984; California 
Commission on the Teaching Profession, 1985; Committee for 
Economic Development, 1985; Bennett, 1986; Carnegie Forum on 
Education and the Economy, 1986; Collins et al., 1986; 
National Governors' Association, 1986). 
Teaching as a profession is characterized by influence, 
efficacy, cooperation, collegiality, and the ability to work 
effectively without extensive supervision or direction (Chubb 
& Moe, 1990). Cetron and Gayle (1991, p.54) state "they claim 
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the right to police their own members as doctors and lawyers 
do, yet reject the accountability that a true professionalism 
carries with it." And "teachers demand to be treated and 
trusted as professionals. . . yet they respond with old-
fashioned unionism. ..." Yet Cetron and Gayle 
optimistically predict that education will be respected as a 
valuable and prestigious profession by the twenty-first 
century. 
At issue with many teachers are the status and salaries 
associated with teaching as a profession. Sizer (1985) 
contends that our culture signals respect for a profession in 
three ways, two of which directly support teachers' concerns 
for status and salary. He states that one aspect of 
professionalism is the autonomy society gives professionals; 
this is the trust to solve problems alone. Certainly teachers 
experience this autonomy as evidenced by the privacy each has 
within the confines of the classroom. Secondly, Sizer (1985, 
p.186) believes that society signals respect with money. "We 
pay people what we think they deserve." Thus, money is a 
cultural expression of our priorities. 
Teacher salaries and benefits need to be competitive with 
other similar professions (Amundson, 1987). Education must 
compete equitably with the medical, legal, scientific, and 
business professions; to do this requires compensation 
according to what the individual produces and their value to 
the educational community (Shaten, 1983). The Rand report 
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(Darling-Hammond, 1984, p.16) reported that faculty salaries 
had decreased "15 percent in real dollars over the past 
decade" at a time when teaching salaries were already 
considerably below other occupations for which college degrees 
are necessary. College freshmen are not entering the 
education field because of poor salary and lack of public 
respect for the profession (Perkins, 1984; Amundson, 1987). 
The National Commission on Excellence in Education (1983, 
p.17) recommended in A Nation at Risk; The Imperative for 
Educational Reform that "Salaries for the teaching profession 
should be increased and should be professionally competitive, 
market-sensitive, and performance-based." 
The inclusion of teachers under the protective umbrella 
of unionism has caused a shift in the eyes of the public from 
professional status to that of blue-collar-worker (Andrews, 
1987). The standardization of faculty salaries under unionism 
has resulted in neither enhanced nor respectable salaries, and 
it has potentially diminished public confidence in the 
education systems. The single salary schedule plan tends to 
reward all the system's teachers minimally rather than 
rewarding less teachers with more relevant compensation as 
with other true professions (Shaten, 1983; Urban, 1985). 
Pritchard and Smarr (1983, p.38), tying the professional-
ization of teaching to a performance-based system, found that 
"73 percent of those polled agreed with the statement, 
'Salaries for the teaching profession should be increased and 
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should be professional by competitive, market-sensitive, and 
performance-based'." As reported in the Southern Regional 
Education Board Career Ladder Clearinghouse (Cornett, 1988, 
p.l), more than 80 percent of Americans favored "increased pay 
for teachers who prove themselves particularly capable." A 
dichotomizing factor between professional and non-professional 
occupations is that of compensation based on individual 
production. Shaten (1983, p.61) believes that as long as the 
teaching profession maintains 
a lock-step salary schedule based on longevity and 
credits, teachers will continue to equally share the tax 
dollar with other salary regimented civil service groups 
such as the police, fire and sanitation departments. And 
we will never receive the professional status, prestige, 
influence and compensation we desire. 
In the comprehensive national survey of 21,389.teachers, 
the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (1990) 
found the teaching profession in need of image improvement; 
within the teaching ranks nearly 40 percent of teachers 
reported that if they had to do it over again, they would not 
become public school teachers. Additionally, within the 
context of professionalism, 44 percent agree that this is a 
poor time for any young person to enter the profession. 
"Improved" community respect for teachers, as perceived by 
teachers, showed a 10 percent drop from 24 percent in 1987 to 
14 percent in 1990, with 30 percent of teachers feeling 
community respect had declined. Finally, Boyer's research 
showed that 91 percent of all teachers polled, ranked higher 
40 
salaries within the top four of proposed changes needed to 
improve teaching as a profession, with 55 percent of teachers 
indicating higher salaries as the most important change. 
Over the past 20 years, teaching as a favored profession 
of parents for their children has dropped from 75 percent in 
1969 to 45 percent in 1983 with a minor increase to 51 percent 
in 1990 (Gallup, 1990; Gallup, 1985). Harris (1986) found 
that teaching ranked a neutral sixth among 15 occupations 
believed to have prestige. 
Andrews (1987, p.13) accurately summarizes the 
influential power of merit pay to the teaching profession. 
The challenge of merit pay, while not in itself 
offering a panacea for education, may prove to be 
the catalvst to upgrade a struggling profession— 
teaching—to that of a status that recognizes it as 
the backbone of future American Democracvl 
Evaluation System 
The implementation of an incentive pay plan can be "a 
means to an end" by providing the philosophical foundation and 
operational processes for a total systems approach to 
personnel evaluation. The National Commission on Excellence 
in Education (1983, p.13) recommended, "Salary, promotion, 
tenure and retention decisions should be tied to an effective 
evaluation system. ..." In an operational sense, a 
comprehensive incentive plan must be strongly integrated with 
the evaluation process (Flannelly & Palaich, 1985; Amundson, 
1987). Andrews (1987, p.viii) stated, "excellence cannot be 
assumed without an effective evaluation system for the 
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faculty." Berman and Mulcahey (1985) found that personnel 
decisions must, be based on performance and that public 
criticism is not on teachers' due process rights, rather on 
the minimal evaluation skills of evaluators and the lack of 
comprehensive evaluation procedures. 
Teaching is highly complex work and should be recognized 
as such by performance appraisal systems (Darling-Hammond, 
1984). Andrews and Marzano (1984) contend that teacher 
recognition must evolve out of a strong and objective 
evaluation system. The evaluation system and the procedures 
by which it is implemented is the key to a successful merit 
pay plan. Just as in industry, merit pay plans can effect 
changes and help school leaders stimulate instructional 
improvement (Brandt, 1990). 
The administration of both the evaluation system and thus 
the incentive pay plan requires clearly defined criteria by 
which employees will be evaluated, an evaluation cycle that 
allows for teacher improvement, and a supportive staff 
development program to provide continued training and skills 
improvement (Manatt, Palmer, & Hidlebaugh, 1976; Cavanaugh & 
Yoder; 1984, Stufflebeam, 1988). Duke and Stiggins (1986, 
p.27) state: 
Performance criteria define the dimensions of teacher 
performance to be evaluated. . . .attributes of sound 
performance criteria and standards vary as a function of 
purpose. . .teachers have met minimum acceptable levels 
of performance for personnel management (accountability) 
reasons. . .in terms of—uniformity for all teachers, 
legal defensibility as central to sound teaching. 
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To this end, researchers from the Research Institute for 
Studies in Education (RISE) at Iowa State University initiated 
a research project in which a consortium of five school 
organizations in the Midwest sought to develop a model for 
school improvement based upon the hypothesized relationships 
between administrator performance, teacher performance, 
student performance, and staff development opportunities. 
Thus, the School Improvement Model (SIM) project was 
originated. SIM successfully developed and tested an 
articulated approach to teacher performance appraisal (Manatt, 
1987; Manatt, 1988). The study included staff development 
opportunities to improve both teaching methodologies and 
performance appraisal. 
SIM'S intent was to influence student achievement vis-a-
vis school improvement by introducing a comprehensive, total-
systems approach to teacher and administrator appraisal based 
on current effective schools and teaching methodology 
research. For SIM's purposes, school improvement was equated 
to "student outcomes" or, using McGreal's (1983) terminology, 
"product." Research findings were based upon "student 
outcomes" results of fourth and eighth grade student 
achievement on norm- and criterion-referenced mathematics and 
reading tests. The study concluded that an articulated 
teacher and administrator evaluation system can significantly 
influence student achievement (Manatt & Stow, 1986; Manatt & 
Holzman, 1990). 
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The SIM model emphasizes the "process" of the plan 
development as well as the functional performance appraisal 
system. Depending on the model used, typical performance 
evaluation is limited to the product of the evaluation, the 
instrumentation, and the resulting employment decisions. 
However, teacher performance evaluation (Manatt, 1986) 
articulates two major criteria: (1) the criteria for teacher 
performance (articulated productive teaching techniques), and 
(2) the operational procedures to monitor and report 
performance. SIM provides a model for the facilitation and 
development of the performance expectations, or criteria, and 
includes the evaluation cycle, due process considerations, and 
staff development opportunities to ensure consistent 
supervisors' appraisal and teacher support. Manatt and 
Petrone (1989) have elaborated upon the expected teacher 
behaviors and have developed a Teacher Performance Indicator 
Bridge. The Teacher Performance Indicator Bridge instrument 
expands the criterion and descriptors used to portray 
effective teaching and further describes expected, observable 
teacher and student behaviors, called indicators, normally 
exhibited when a teacher is "meeting" or "exceeding" the 
stated criterion. 
Motivation 
The strength of money and its role as a motivator for job 
performance has long been argued. Although many of the major 
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motivation theorists did not initially nor specifically 
address the potential influence of money as a motivator, their 
theories have explained the motivating role of money and the 
improvement of the quality of job performance. Today, , 
monetary incentives are recognized as influencing employees 
(Cresap, McCormick, & Paget, 1984). 
Maslow's (1954) theory of the hierarchy of human needs 
states that man's needs are delineated in an ascending 
priority and that lower-level needs must be satisfied prior to 
moving on toward satisfying higher-level needs. Money, viewed 
as an obvious job-related outcome, can be used to fulfill 
other needs such as food, shelter, security, social 
interactions, and esteem. Therefore, it can be argued that 
money is a vehicle that allows man to meet the initial human 
needs and thus can be considered a motivator. Money, however, 
is not considered a human need as it stands by itself (Lawler, 
1971). 
Herzberg's (1959) research provided the two-factor 
theory, satisfiers or motivators versus dissatisfiers or 
maintenance factors. His theory states that satisfiers 
contribute to job satisfaction and are associated with 
gratifying or motivating experiences. Satisfiers include 
recognition, achievement, and advancement. Dissatisfiers 
contribute to the job dissatisfaction. These include 
supervision, company policies, and working conditions. 
Herzberg found pay to be equally present in both contexts; pay 
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could be a dissatisfier when it was unfairly low, or as a 
satisfier when it was viewed as a form of recognition. 
Ironically, Herzberg classified pay as a dissatisfier, 
although many studies have provided mixed support for that 
theory (Lawler, 1971). However, Herzberg's two-factor theory 
clearly suggests that money can be instrumental in satisfying 
one's esteem and recognition needs. And insufficient pay is a 
primary source of dissatisfaction among teachers (Lortie, 
1975) . 
Lawler (1971) in an impressive analysis of 49 studies on 
the importance of pay to employees found that the average rank 
of pay was third and that 27 percent of the studies found pay 
ranked first in importance among job factors. Similar studies 
of the importance teachers assign to pay as a motivator rank 
pay third or fourth (Rosenholtz & Smylie, 1984). Porter and 
Lawler (1975) reported that pay satisfaction will be related 
to performance only when pay is based upon the performance, 
and pay serves to motivate employees when the pay is closely 
tied to performance. Lawler found when pay is tied to 
performance the resulting effects indicate; pay is important; 
pay motivates; pay satisfaction is high; and absenteeism and 
turnover is centered on poor performance. 
In relation to public education, Andrews and Marzano 
(1984, p.106) found the importance of recognition; 
Average performance faculty people can control, 
weaken and destroy highly motivated faculty if the 
"group process" operates in an institutional climate 
that is void of a recognition process. However, an 
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institution that fosters the motivation of 
outstanding faculty efforts through formal 
recognition, merit, and public awareness of such 
efforts makes it difficult for the "average 
performance" persons to force regression back 
towards the mean. Recognition can thus be used to 
keep outstanding faculty out in a position of 
leadership. It can also provide the motivation for 
more faculty to try to move away from an average 
performance. 
Vroom (1964) and Atkinson (1958) found that a number of 
factors within organizations could serve to motivate workers. 
Their findings suggested that pay, recognition, methods for 
monitoring performance, and providing feedback were potential 
motivators. Additionally, Vroom (1964) views money as 
acquiring an importance as a function of its perceived 
instrumentality for obtaining other desired outcomes. Hawley 
(1985) found that three generalizations could be made from 
these findings for merit pay plans: (1) merit pay can be a 
significant resource for school systems to motivate workers, 
(2) performance based pay plans can increase the processes 
through which employees are monitored and feedback given, and 
(3) depending on the implementation procedures, the nature of 
teacher autonomy and supervision could increase teachers' 
sense of efficacy. Monetary recognition is a tangible and 
visible form of reward for effective performance and is 
inherently motivating (Tecker, 1985). Incentive plans, in 
both business and industry are dependent on rational 
motivation theory (Lawler, 1971; Wilson, 1980). Business and 
industry contends that merit increases have the most leverage 
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in shaping employee behavior (Cresap, McCormick, & Paget, 
1984). Studies conclude that extrinsic rewards such as money 
do affect teachers' attitude and performance (Prase, Hetzel, & 
Grant, 1982; Mitchell, Ortiz, & Mitchell, 1984). 
Brandt (1990) views incentive plans as an intervention 
for the early burnout phenomenon experienced by many teachers. 
The problem is commonly known as plateauing. Structural 
plateauing occurs when promotion to a higher level is less 
likely or not available; content plateauing takes place when 
there is a loss of the sense of learning or job stimulation in 
one's present position. In both cases, Brandt concludes that 
incentive pay plans can offer significant opportunities to 
stimulate and advance teachers away from career stagnation. 
Brandt also found in an extensive national survey of 
incentive plans that money was the number one reason for their 
participation in an incentive pay program. He states: 
Obviously the extra money for individuals has to be 
substantial to have an effect. . . .$200 is not worth 
complicating an already complicated work life. . .. Even 
$2,000 to $3,000 obviously serves as a sufficient 
incentive for many. . .(p.66) 
At the onset of this current wave of incentive pay plans, 
a 1983 study of 47 districts indicated that an average of 
$1,064 was awarded (Educational Research Service, 1983). 
Citing current performance based pay plans, the approximate 
range of compensations awarded is from $1,000 to $4,000. The 
American Association of School Administrators recommend 
incentive awards to range between 5 percent and 20 percent 
48 
(Tecker, 1985). The South Carolina Teacher Incentive Plan 
awarded between $2,000 and $3,000 annually. The Danville, 
Georgia plan compensates teachers between $2,500 to $4,000 
(Cornett, 1988). In Round Valley, California the average 
merit compensation is $2,800 (Inman, 1985). And the 
Amphitheatre, Arizona plan provided for increases between 
$1,000 and $2,000 (Amsler et al., 1988). Brandt (1990) found 
that $2,000 to $3,000 provided significant incentive for 
Tennessee teachers. 
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CHAPTER III. METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
The methodology of this study differs from that of a 
hypothesis-based research study. Its intent is to develop a 
comprehensive performance pay plan model that could serve as a 
turn-key plan for school districts to implement. The paradigm 
presented will be a merit pay plan developed to compensate 
teachers meeting an expected level of competence as 
articulated by the evaluation instruments and processes. This 
study will use a hypothetical school district, hereafter 
called Westonlee School District. 
Plan Development 
The development of a district's incentive pay plan 
requires clear articulation of the goals and objectives of the 
plan. It must hold up to the rigors of the teachers' union 
examination, be efficiently, consistently, and objectively 
administered, and provide teachers with a clear and simple 
appeals process (Tecker, 1985). Additionally, merit pay plans 
should: 
-have effective evaluation procedures; 
-have workable administrative procedures; 
-have the commitment of the school board and the school 
administrative staff; 
-involve the staff in developing the program; 
-promote teacher satisfaction; 
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-have adequate financing; 
-be available to all who qualify; 
-have a plausible definition of superior performance; 
-have valid and verifiable measures of results; 
-apply assessment measures objectively and consistently; 
and 
-promote increased learning of pupils (Robinson, 1983). 
Sibson (1974) finds similar characteristics required for 
merit pay programs in industry; they are applicable to 
education as well: 
-the program should be structured to attract and retain 
the numbers and kinds of employees required by the 
business; 
-the program should help maintain the company in a 
reasonably competitive position in its product 
market; 
-the nature of the program and the associated 
administrative time costs must be reasonable and be in 
proportion to the other priorities and time demands on 
the company's financial resources; 
-the plan must gain and maintain employee acceptance; 
-the plan must play a positive role in motivating 
employees ; 
-the program must gain acceptance from the firm's 
"public" entities; and 
-the plan must provide opportunities for employees at all 
51 
levels to achieve their reasonable aspirations in a 
framework of equity and impartiality. 
Ultimately, incentive plans should provide a structured 
process for school districts to promote, grant tenure, and 
make rationale retention decisions while rewarding superior 
teachers (Education Commission of the States, 1983) . When 
considering teacher evaluation and merit recognition, 
qualities a solid plan must possess are; teacher confidence 
with the system and strong commitment of the administration 
(Savage, 1983). 
The background presented on performance-based pay 
justifies the examination of current evaluation models from 
which to develop an incentive pay plan. As previously 
mentioned, a merit pay plan must be linked to a solid teacher 
evaluation system that reflects the nature and intent of the 
plan. Thomas L. McGreal (1983), in a book he wrote entitled 
Successful Teacher Evaluation, proposes a taxonomy of teacher 
evaluation models. McGreal*s taxonomy clearly identifies five 
models of teacher evaluation from which philosophies of 
evaluation and the procedural implementation of the systems 
can be classified. McGreal offers the five models: (1) 
Common Law; (2) Goal-setting; (3) Product; (4) Clinical 
Supervision; and (5) Artistic. 
The pay for performance model presented in this study 
reflects the integrated use of three of McGreal's models. 
Petrone (1990) found two of these models to be used quite 
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extensively in schools nationally; goal-setting and clinical 
supervision. The third model, product, was found to be a 
limited style of evaluation; however, with the new emphasis on 
Mastery Learning and Outcome-based Education, the frequency of 
this model's use will likely increase (Lezotte, 1988; Spady, 
1988; Guskey, 1990). 
A succinct description of the relevant models of the 
taxonomy follows. 
(1) Goal-setting: This model is characterized by the 
emphasis on an individualized approach to teacher evaluation 
leading to goals necessary for self-improvement. McGreal 
(1983, p.26) explains its' basic tenet as being "the focus 
should be on showing continual growth and improvement and 
continually doing things better." Goal-setting processes have 
been incorporated into many teacher evaluation systems in the 
form of performance improvement commitments, job improvement 
targets, and a host of other synonyms (Bolton, 1973; Redfern, 
1980; Manatt, 1988). Goal-setting via job targets influence 
maximizing teacher commitment and help ensure a quality, 
productive evaluation system (Darling-Hammond, 1986). This 
model should be collaborative in nature and dependent upon 
teacher and supervisor conferring together to determine the 
goals (Hyman, 1975) . 
(2) Product: This model equates the teacher's 
performance to results of student achievement measured by 
criterion-referenced tests. It is far less dependent on 
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method, style, or process; rather, it emphasizes the 
productivity-ability for teachers to produce student learning. 
Millman (1981, p.146) advocates: "Using student achievement 
as a measure of teacher competence rests on the assumption 
that an important function of teaching is to enhance student 
learning." Product models are based on "student outcomes"; 
they are "input-output", product-oriented models (Hanushek, 
1989). Feldvebel (1980, p.417) states, "since we cannot prove 
that any one method, style, or process of teaching is 
superior, all that we can do is go by results." 
(3) Clinical supervision: This type of evaluation is 
based on a collégial and collaborative process of observing 
teacher performance. It requires two-way communication; there 
must exist an equality of responsibility on both the teacher's 
and supervisor's part (Sergiovanni, 1982). Cogan (1973, p.54) 
interprets clinical supervision as "the analysis of data and 
the relationships between teacher and supervisor form the 
basis of the program, procedures, and strategies designed to 
improve the students' learning by improving the teacher's 
classroom behavior." McGreal (1983, p.29) asserts: 
Clinical Supervision assumes that most teachers— 
when supplied with adequate information and allowed 
to act on it—can analyze, interpret, and decide in 
a self-directed and constructive manner. 
Although each clinical supervision system labels the 
steps differently, there is general agreement that this 
supervision process contains five common stages: (1) pre-
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observation conference; (2) observation of teaching episode; 
(3) analysis of lesson data and strategy for post-observation 
conference; (4) post-observation conference; and (5) post-
conference analysis (Goldhammer, 1969; Cogan, 1973; Acheson & 
Gall, 1980). 
Because of the dynamic influence each of these models 
presents to the teaching/learning experience and assuming that 
each of these models does not necessarily have to exist in an 
"evaluative vacuum" by itself, it would be advantageous to 
develop a teacher evaluation system and, thus, a complementary 
merit pay plan, that could integrate as many of these models 
as appropriate. Gleaning the conceptual integrity from those 
relevant models and tying them to the current effective 
schools research will provide a solid foundation for a new 
teacher appraisal model from which to develop a viable 
performance-based pay plan. 
During the formal process of developing a merit pay plan, 
consideration must be given to the planning process. As 
recommended by Cresap, McCormick, and Paget (1984) and 
presented in Figure 1, the planning process consists of six 
major steps; (1) establish a planning process; (2) determine 
objectives and criteria; (3) develop a plan; (4) determine 
cost; (5) develop implementation plan; and (6) approve and 
implement plan. This study will focus on step three, develop 
a plan, and step four, determine salary cost. 
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PLANNING PROCESS FLOWCHART 
•Provide leadership 
•Plan participation 
•Develop decision-making 
process 
•Select prototypes 
•Develop features 
•Assess obstacles 
•Reassess earlier decisions 
•Assess current situation 
•Determine criteria 
Determine 
Cost 
Implement Plan 
Determine 
Objectives 
and Criteria 
Establish a 
Planning 
Process 
Develop 
a Plan 
Develop 
Implementation 
Plan 
•Estimate costs and •Plan for phase-in 
benefits •Management plan 
•Reassess earlier decisions •Communications plan 
•Monitoring and assessment 
•Reassess earlier decisions 
Figure l. Steps followed for planning a Pay for Performance 
Plan 
Pay for Performance Plan 
As a point of departure for the construction of the merit 
pay plan model, the study will use an established and 
currently implemented Teacher Performance Evaluation (TPE) 
cycle from a School Improvement Model (SIM) projects school 
district, as discussed previously. This TPE system will 
provide the philosophical and operational foundation of the 
plan. It will incorporate the facilitating procedures and 
timelines representative of a typical SIM Teacher Evaluation 
Cycle and Procedures (Appendix A). The TPE system will also 
include the selected teacher performance criteria and 
evaluation standards represented in the aforementioned Teacher 
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Performance Indicator Bridge (Appendix B). Additionally, the 
plan will reflect the established district's Philosophy of 
Education (Appendix C), Philosophy of Instruction (Appendix 
D), and Philosophy of Evaluation (Appendix E). 
Using the TPE system coupled with current effective 
school's research, sound pedagogy, and accepted motivation 
theory, variables will be determined that represent assessable 
and influential factors for evaluating teacher performance and 
student learning. The model presented will combine three 
elements from McGreal's (1983) Taxonomy of Teacher Evaluation 
Models: (1) Product models, (2) Clinical Supervision models, 
and (3) Goal-setting models. The "product" element aligns 
with the use of student mastery levels via criterion-
referenced tests that will measure student outcomes. The 
Goal-setting factor emphasizes the use of job targets or 
professional growth plans collaboratively developed by the 
teacher and supervisor, and facilitates increased focus on 
specific areas of growth. The Clinical Supervision model's 
contribution is the systematic and collaborative process of 
observing teacher performance with targeted feedback and 
specific instruction for continued skill attainment. Thus, 
the elements from the Goal-setting and Clinical Supervision 
models will be integral factors for the procedural and teacher 
support components of the paradigm. 
Algorithms will be developed that reflect the weight and 
scales for computation of each variable as a part of the 
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overall teacher evaluation rating. For each variable scored, 
specific elements will be mathematically defined and 
procedures will be delineated that will affect the teacher's 
rating. Additional parameters will also be determined such as 
teacher staff development activities and student mastery 
levels. Examples of teachers' and students' mastery scores 
will be presented to graphically display potential results. 
Westonlee School District Pay for Performance Plan 
The Westonlee School District Pay for Performance Plan 
was developed for the purpose of compensating professional 
educators for providing exemplary instruction to Westonlee 
School District students. The Pay for Performance Plan 
provides incentive for the teacher to grow professionally 
while sharing the common district goal: all children can 
learn and achieve their potential. To this end, the Pay for 
Performance Plan outlines a structured, multi-dimensional 
program that specifically addresses the interrelationships of 
three weighted strands: student achievement, student 
feedback, and the supervisor's rating. 
Following School Improvement Model Project protocol, a 
Stakeholders' Committee was convened to develop the evaluation 
policies and procedures leading to the final development of 
the Pay for Performance Plan. As with all Stakeholders' 
Committees, 51 percent of the participants are current 
classroom teachers. This ensures teachers an active role in 
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the development of the complete evaluation system and it taps 
the expertise garnered by these professionals. Careful 
consideration was given to blending the district's philosophy 
of evaluation, the processes and evaluation cycles, and 
outcomes of the School Improvement Model Project and current 
effective schools research into the Pay for Performance Plan. 
The primary goal during the plan's development was to adhere 
to the district's Stakeholders' Committee guidelines while 
ensuring the appropriate weight and balance among the three 
measured factors. It is understood that the Pay for 
Performance Plan will stand by itself as a district 
compensation program. Contracted salary schedules and 
compensation ranges are separate and subject to the current 
negotiation practices of the meet-and-confer agreement 
process. 
Paradigm overview 
The paradigm relies on two main components: (1) the 
Continuing Professional Growth Schedule, and (2) the 
algorithms that ultimately provide a score derived from the 
measurement of three specific teacher-influenced factors. 
The first element, the algorithms, combine the 
measurements of three separate factors; Supervisor's Rating, 
Student Achievement, and Student Feedback. They provide one 
overall computed score that represents the teacher's 
performance; this score is the Teacher's Composite Score. The 
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initial comparable weight distribution for the three factors 
is; Supervisor's Rating weighted 3, Student Achievement 
assigned a weight of 2, and Student Feedback is given a weight 
of 1. As presented in Figure 2, the Supervisor's Rating is 
worth 50 points, the Student Achievement factor is worth 33 
points, and the Student Feedback Report is valued at 17 
points. The points earned for the three factors will be added 
together to produce the Teacher's Composite Score for which 
differentiated compensation will be awarded. 
• 
SDFEFVISOR'S RATING-50 POINTS 
•Must meet employee rules 
•Summatlve Evaluation Report with 
consultlve peer input 
•Must not receive more than three 
"does not meet" criterion ratings 
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT-33 POINTS 
•Percent of students meeting 
district's predetermined Mastery 
Level on Criterion Referenced Test 
•Adjusted Average Class Size added 
to Student Achievement Score if 
class size Is above district 
predetermined class size maximum 
STUDENT FEEDBACK REPORT-17 
POINTS 
•Student Feedback to Teachers 
Questionnaire scored against 
district calculated mean 
Figure 2. The three factors and values producing the 
Teacher's Composite Score 
The second, the Continuing Professional Growth Schedule, 
is the keystone to the plan in that it requires both the 
district and each individual teacher to commit to an organized 
plan of professional growth. Based on the teacher's years of 
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experience, each teacher must fulfill specific requirements 
associated with classroom observations, evaluation, formal 
higher education training, and professional growth activities. 
As presented in Figure 3, the plan begins with the 
teacher and administrator collaboratively developing the 
activities required for the Professional Activities Report 
portion of the Continuing Professional Growth Schedule. A 
Teacher Composite Score is derived from the results from the 
three areas of measurement; (1) Supervisor's Rating; a score 
based on summative evaluation report with input from peer 
coach, and must meet employee rules; (2) Student Achievement: 
a score representing the Student Mastery Level Percent based 
on the student's results from the district's criterion-
referenced tests, and a score for the teacher's adjusted, 
average class size; and (3) Student Feedback Report; a score 
based on the district mean score results of the Student 
Feedback Report. Teacher's Composite Score ranges and the 
corresponding Compensation ranges will be predetermined. If 
an individual's Teacher's Composite Score is below the agreed 
upon district Teacher Composite Score range, the teacher will 
not receive merit pay and the administrator will review and 
provide specific input to the teacher through targets for 
improvement as part of the Continuing Professional Growth 
Schedule. If an individual's Teacher's Composite Score is 
above the district Teacher's Composite Score range, the 
teacher will receive merit compensation. 
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PAY FOR PERFORMANCE FLOWCHART 
TEACHER ADMINISTRATOR 
YEARS OF 
EXPERIENCE 
CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL 
GROWTH SCHEDULE 
OBSERV&TimiS 
GRADUATE 
HOURS/DEGREE 
PROFESSIONAL 
ACTIVITZES 
REPORT 
STUDENT 
FEEDBACK 
17 Pointa 
• Sbudanfc F«odbac]c 
to Teaoherm 
Quastlonnalr* 
•aorad against 
district mean 
ADMINISTRATOR 
REVIEW & INPUT 
FOR JOB TARGETS 
PAY FOR 
PERFORMANCE 
COMPENSATION 
Abov* district 
minimum scora 
TEACHER'S COMPOSITE 
SCORE 
100 Points 
Balow district 
minimum scora 
SUPERVISOR'S 
RATING 
50 Points 
•Must maat aa^loyaa 
rulas 
«Summatlva Evaluation 
Raport with 
consultiva paar input 
STUDENT 
ACHIEVEMENT 
33 Points 
•Parcant of students 
meeting district's 
Mastery Level 
on C.R.T.s 
•Adjusted Average 
Class Sice 
Figure 3. Steps followed for participation in the Pay for 
Performance Plan 
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Supervisor's Rating Factor 
The Supervisor's Rating factor of the Pay for Performance 
Plan is comprised of one score worth a maximum of 50 points of 
the total Teacher's Compensation Score. The Supervisor's 
Rating factor is the total score from the teacher's summative 
evaluation report and follows the established district Teacher 
Performance Evaluation Cycle and Procedures (Appendix A). 
Teachers will be evaluated against the standards 
delineated by the teacher performance areas, criteria, and 
descriptors, using the Behavioral Anchored Rating Scale (BARS) 
mode, as established by the Stakeholders' Committee. These 
performance standards are outlined on the teacher evaluation 
instruments, and the Behavioral Anchored Responses are further 
described by the Teacher Performance Indicator Bridge 
(Appendix B). 
The Teacher Performance Indicator Bridge is an "effective 
teaching", research-based blueprint that ties teacher's 
performance and administrator's ratings to specific and 
observable, effective teaching behaviors. The Teacher 
Performance Indicator Bridge clearly describes the specific 
teacher behaviors that are representative of each teaching 
skill and hooks them to the levels of performance that "meets 
criterion" or "exceeds criterion." The Teacher Performance 
Indicator Bridge also delineates the expected student 
behaviors that will be observed when the teacher is 
demonstrating the "meets" or "exceeds" standards. Those areas 
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in which a teacher demonstrates skill levels meeting or 
exceeding the district standards will receive predetermined 
point values weighted for the specific criteria. 
Peer Coaching 
As a demonstrated element of professionalism, collégial 
feedback is integral to the continued growth of the 
professional teacher (Chrisco, 1989). Peer Coaching helps re­
establish professional communication and dialogue. It allows 
teachers additional opportunities to rehearse the lesson 
through pre-conferencing. And Peer Coaching brings a 
professional, reflective aspect to teaching; peer coaches 
facilitate prompting questions that stimulate analytical 
thought about the teacher behaviors observed (Raney & Robbins, 
1989; Chase & Wolfe, 1989). Additionally, it is important to 
collect data from many different sources to ensure a more 
accurate and objective assessment of the teacher performance 
Manatt, 1986; Duke & Stiggins, 1986; Stufflebeam, 1988). To 
support this effort, a formal Peer Coaching program will be 
implemented to broaden the data collection effort. Peer 
coaches will observe teachers following the Clinical 
Supervision model of conferring twice each year. Prior to the 
appropriate administrator completing the Summative Evaluation 
Report, the peer coach may confer and share with the 
evaluating administrator his/her findings of the teacher's 
performance only upon request of the observed teacher. All 
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findings will have previously been discussed with the teacher 
as a part of the Peer Coaching process. Although the peer 
coachs input is not quantitatively nor directly included in 
the Supervisor's Rating, it is a formal source of data for the 
administrator to consider when rating each of the performance 
criteria. During an appeal of a Teacher Composite Score or 
more specifically the Supervisor's Rating, the teacher may 
request the data collected by the peer coach to be submitted. 
Criterion ranking and performance level weight 
The Stakeholders' Committee will determine the 
performance criteria in the Westonlee School District Teacher 
Performance Evaluation instrument. The following are the 
criteria established by the Stakeholders' Committee: 
I.A Demonstrates effective planning skills including 
time, materials, and resources. 
I.B Implements the lesson plan. 
I.C Motivates students. 
I.D Communicates effectively with students. 
I.B Provides students with specific evaluative feedback. 
I.F Displays a thorough knowledge of curriculum and 
subject matter. 
I.G Selects learning content congruent with the 
prescribed curriculum. 
I.H Demonstrates accountability for success of students. 
I.I Makes efficient use of time to ensure maximum 
learning. 
I.J Sets high expectations for student achievement. 
II.A Displays evidence of classroom organization. 
II.B Adheres to high standards for student 
behavior. 
II.C Organizes students for effective instruction. 
IIIiA Demonstrates effective inter-personal relationships 
with others. 
III.B Demonstrates awareness of the individual needs 
of students. 
III.C Promotes positive self-concept. 
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III.D Demonstrates sensitivity in relating to 
students. 
III.E Promotes self-discipline and responsibility. 
IV.A Demonstrates employee responsibilities. 
IV.B Demonstrates willingness to keep curriculum 
and instructional practices current. 
IV.C Supports school regulations and policies. 
Each Stakeholder will rank the criteria and a mean score 
for each criterion will be derived. A final ranking of the 
criteria will be established based on descending mean scores. 
The criteria are then clustered into three groups indicating 
the 80 percent, 70 percent, and 60 percent levels of 
distribution, respectively. These percents of levels of 
distribution are chosen based on the belief that they 
represent a quantitative measure of the philosophical 
importance the Stakeholders place on the criteria as it 
pertains to fulfilling teaching/teacher responsibilities. 
Each criteria cluster is assigned a weight for each of 
the two evaluation rating categories of "meets" and "exceeds." 
Table 1 delineates the point distribution for each criterion 
that will be used when evaluating a teacher. The criteria are 
clustered in descending order, 80 percent, 70 percent, and 60 
percent, respectively. This ranked clustering denotes the 
weight assigned to each criterion within the cluster and for 
each of the two performance levels. 
The proportional rating weights between the "meets" and 
"exceeds" categories are based on an upper two-thirds, or 
66.66 percent ratio representing a skewed point proportion, 
rather than a straight 50 percent or one-to-two proportion 
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(e.g.. Criterion III.C promotes positive self-concept: 
"meets" = 2.133, "exceeds" = 3.2; 2.133 is 66.66 percent of 
3.2). This proportion is used to illustrate the difference 
between the "meets" and "exceeds" categories but that the 
implied competence of the "exceeds" category is not twice that 
of the "meets" category. The 66.66 ratio distributes the 
influencing power of any one criterion less dramatically 
within each cluster. As illustrated in Table 1, adding the 
maximum points earned for all 18 criteria for the "meets" and 
"exceeds" standards, respectively, the point range for the 
Supervisor's Rating is 33.32 to 50, rather than a 25 to 50 
range. 
As with all SIM evaluation instruments, there will be 
performance levels delineating "needs improvement" and "does 
not meet criterion." The "needs improvement" performance 
level will not receive a score; such a score will have a 
neutral effect. However, the "does not meet criterion" 
performance level will receive a negative weight equal to the 
"meets criterion" value. As an example, a teacher receiving a 
"does not meet criterion" rating on Criterion 8, "Motivates 
students", would receive a -2.133. A teacher receiving more 
than the maximum three (3) "does not meet criterion" ratings, 
will not be eligible for Pay for Performance compensation. 
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Table 1. Point distribution for each criterion to be used 
when evaluating a teacher for the Supervisor's 
Rating factor 
RANK CRITERION MEETS EXCEEDS 
1 I .J Sets high expectations for 
student achievement. 
2. 133 3 .2 
2 III .C Promotes positive self-concept. 2. 133 3 .2 
3 I .1 Makes efficient use of time 
to ensure maximum learning. 
2. 133 3 .2 
4 I .F Displays a thorough knowledge 
of curriculum and subject matter. 
2. 133 3 .2 
5 III .B Demonstrates awareness of the 
individual needs of students. 
2. 133 3 .2 
6 I .D Communicates effectively with 
students. 
2. 133 3 .2 
7 I .G Selects learning content congruent 
with the prescribed curriculum. 
2. 133 3 .2 
8 I .C Motivates students. 2. 133 3 .2 
9 II .3 Adheres to high standards for 
student behavior. 
2. 133 3 .2 
10 III .D Demonstrates sensitivity in 
relating to students. 
2. 133 3 .2 
Top 70 Percent 
11 I.E Provides students with specific 1.6 2.4 
evaluative feedback. 
12 I.H Demonstrates accountability for 1.6 2.4 
success of students. 
13 III.E Promotes self-discipline and 1.6 2.4 
responsibility. 
14 I.A Demonstrates effective planning 1.6 2.4 
skills including time, materials, 
and resources. 
15 I.B Implements the lesson plan. 1.6 2.4 
Top 60 Percent 
16 II.A Displays evidence of classroom 1.33 2.0 
organization. 
17 IIIiA Demonstrates effective inter- 1.33 2.0 
personal relationships with others. 
18 II.C Organizes students for effective 1.33 2.0 
instruction. 
MAXIMUM TOTALS PER EVALUATION CATEGORY 33.32 50.00 
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Employee rules 
For this plan, 18 of the 21 criteria are being used. The 
remaining three criteria are considered minimum employee rules 
and thus are not included in the computation of the 
Supervisor's Rating. Employee rules are those absolute 
requirements that are necessary for each employee to meet 
irrespective of his/her teaching performance. Employee rules 
reflect the organization's need to first have good employees 
who comply to the organization's mission, rules, regulations, 
and procedures. Not included on Table 1 are items IV.A, 
"Demonstrates employee responsibilities", IV.B, "Demonstrates 
willingness to keep curriculum and instructional practices 
current", and IV.C, "Supports school regulations and 
policies." Teachers must receive "meet" or "exceed" ratings 
on these employee rules to be eligible for Pay for Performance 
compensation. 
Supervisor's Rating example computation 
To demonstrate the computation of the Supervisor's 
Rating, Table 2 represents a teacher's results for each 
criterion. As determined in Table 1, the values assigned for 
"meets" and "exceeds" have been awarded, and to illustrate the 
"does not meet criterion" Criteria Number IIIB received a 
value of -2.133. By adding the values, the teacher would 
receive 38.13 points out of 50 possible for the Supervisor's 
Rating factor. 
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Table 2. Computation example for establishing a teacher's 
Supervisor's Rating 
RANK CRITERION CRITERION VALUE 
1 I.J Sets high expectations for student 2.133 
achievement. 
2 III.C Promotes positive self-concept. 3.2 
3 I.I Makes efficient use of time to 3.2 
ensure maximum learning. 
4 I.F Displays a thorough knowledge 2.133 
of curriculum and subject matter. 
5 III.B Demonstrates awareness of the -2.133 
individual needs of students. 
6 I.D Communicates effectively with 2.133 
students. 
7 I.G Selects learning content congruent 3.2 
with the prescribed curriculum. 
8 I.C Motivates students. 3.2 
9 II.B Adheres to high standards for 3.2 
student behavior. 
10 III.D Demonstrates sensitivity in relating 2.133 
to students. 
11 I.E Provides students with specific 2.4 
evaluative feedback. 
12 I.H Demonstrates accountability for 1.6 
success of students. 
13 III.E Promotes self-discipline and 1.6 
responsibility. 
14 I.A Demonstrates effective planning 2.4 
skills. 
15 I.B Implements the lesson plan. 2.4 
16 II.A Displays evidence of classroom 2.0 
organization. 
17 III.A Demonstrates effective interpersonal 2.0 
relationships with others. 
18 II.C Organizes students for effective 1.33 
instruction. 
TEACHER'S SUPERVISOR'S RATING 38.13 
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Student Achievement Factor 
The Student Achievement factor of the Westonlee School 
District Pay for Performance Plan is comprised of two numeric 
indicators: Student Mastery Level Percent and Adjusted 
Average Class Size. The Student Achievement factor 
constitutes one-third, or 33 points, of the total Teacher's 
Composite Score. The weighing of the Student Mastery Level is 
100 percent of the total Student Achievement factor. The 
Adjusted Average Class Size, if applicable, is added to the 
total Student Achievement factor. Thus, it is possible for a 
teacher to receive more than 33 points if his/her adjusted 
class size exceeds the district maximum and he/she receives 
the maximum Student Mastery Level points (e.g.. 33 points + 
1.5 points for three students above the district class size 
maximum, yields 34.5 points). 
Student Masterv Level 
Westonlee School District has developed a comprehensive 
battery of criterion-referenced tests that is directly aligned 
with the district's articulated curriculum. Each subject at 
each grade level (1-12) has a Criterion Referenced Test that 
will serve as the Student Achievement-Student Mastery Level 
testing instrument. Each test's item bank has been developed 
by the content and grade level specialists of Westonlee School 
District currently instructing in the tested areas. Test 
items have been validated and curriculum alignment verified 
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through exhaustive pilot testing and statistical analysis. 
Test reliability will be established as each test is 
administered throughout the test development cycle. After the 
initial pilot administration and through continued analysis, 
each successive year's test data will be added to the baseline 
data for the purpose of updating district norms and 
determining expected percent of mastery for each 
instrument/course. 
A criterion-referenced pre-test and mastery test will be 
administered to all students for each class or discipline as 
per the district testing schedule. Student Mastery Level data 
will be ascertained for every student within every class that 
he/she is officially enrolled. Pre-test data will be used 
exclusively by the teacher for the purpose of establishing a 
baseline of student performance and diagnosis of student 
abilities for targeting more specific instruction, 
methodologies, and in-class grouping. 
Student Mastery Level is the required percent of course 
objectives met by each student as demonstrated by the mastery 
test. Grade level, course content, grouping, type of course, 
and the established district norms will be considered in 
establishing the district's Student Mastery Level for each 
criterion-referenced test. By meeting the predetermined 
Student Mastery Level, students will have demonstrated their 
learning of core course objectives at the performance level 
determined by the district. Student Mastery Level for 
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identified Special Education students with Individual 
Education Plans (I.E.P.s), will be rated on the expected 
percent level of mastery of the mastery test as predicated on 
the specific learning goals determined at the time of 
establishing the I.E.P. 
Student Mastery Level Percent 
Student Mastery Level Percent is the percent of all the 
teacher's non-exempt students meeting the predetermined 
Student Mastery Level of the mastery test scores. (Exemption 
status is discussed in the Adjusted Average Class Size 
section.) A simple "GO-NO GO" system of analysis will be used 
for determining the number of students to be used in the 
computation establishing the "Number of Students Meeting 
Student Mastery Level" (Figure 4). Students meeting the 
district's Student Mastery Level will "go" and be added into 
the computation of the Student Achievement Factor, while 
students not meeting the criteria will "no go" and not be 
counted. 
A Student Mastery Level Percent is calculated by taking 
the total number of a teacher's non-exempt students in all 
classes taught and dividing by the teacher's total number of 
students meeting the district's Student Mastery Level for all 
classes taught. There is an elementary and a secondary 
example in Figure 4. In the elementary teacher's example, 73 
students out of a possible 96 students met the Student Mastery 
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Level Percent of 76. In the secondary teacher's example, 84 
out of 108 students met the student Mastery Level, thus 
resulting in a Student Mastery Level Percent of 78. 
Formula: 
TOTAL NUMBER OF STUDENTS MEETING / TOTAL NUMBER OF NON-
MASTERY LEVEL / EXEMPT STUDENTS 
Example Data; 
# of Students Meeting Non-exempt 
Elementary Subject Matter Mastery Level Students 
English 17 24 
Math 19 24 
Reading 15 24 
Social Studies 22 24 
73 96 
Calculation Example: 
73 / 96 = .76 = 76% Student Mastery Level Percent 
Example Data: 
# of Students Meeting Non-exempt 
Secondary Subject Matter Mastery Level Students 
Physics 16 25 
Physics 19 22 
Chemistry 22 24 
Biology 27 37 
84 108 
Calculation Example: 
84 / 108 = .78 = 78% Student Mastery Level Percent 
Figure 4. student Mastery Level Percent formula and example 
computation 
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Student Achievement point value computation 
The district will determine the level of expected student 
mastery. For the purpose of this study, assume the district 
has set an expected Student Mastery Level Percent of 80 
percent. Curricularly this percent represents the mastery of 
80 percent of the course objectives; operationally it 
represents the required passing score on the criterion-
referenced mastery test. The calculation of the point 
distribution for the Student Achievement Factor will be made 
against a predetermined Student Mastery Level Percent range of 
20 (100 percent the high, 80 percent the low). Likewise, a 
predetermined range of points of 23 (33 the high, 10 the low) 
will be equally distributed against the Student Mastery Level 
range of 20; thus, 100 percent will be assigned 33 points and 
80 percent will be assigned 10 points. 
Student Achievement point value formula 
In Figure 5, the simple calculation of dividing the point 
range of 23 by the Student Mastery Level Percent Range of 20 
will produce the point value constant of 1.15 (A). It is 
awarded to every composite percentage point above the 
predetermined baseline percent of 80 percent. 
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Formula: 
POINTS RANGE / STUDENT MASTERY LEVEL PERCENT RANGE = A 
Calculation Example: 
23 / 20 = 1.15 
Figure 5. Formula for determining the point value assigned 
for each percentage point above the pre-determined 
Mastery Level of 80 percent 
Student Achievement Factor formula 
As illustrated in Figure 6, a teacher with a Student 
Mastery Level Percent of 85 would be awarded 15.75 points out 
of a possible 33 points for the Student Achievement factor. 
This is derived by multiplying the established constant of 
1.15 by the difference of the teacher's Student Mastery Level 
Percent and the baseline percent, and adding the product to 
the baseline points. 
Formula: 
INDIVIDUAL TEACHER'S 
[(A)(STUDENT MASTERY LEVEL PERCENT-BASELINE PERCENT)]+BASELINE 
POINTS 
Example Data: 
Individual Teacher's Student Mastery Level Percent = 85 
Calculation Example: 
[(1.15) (85-80)] + 10 [(1.15) (5)] + 10 = 
5.75 + 10 = 15.75 
Figure 6. Formula and computations determining the points 
earned for an example Student Mastery Level Percent 
of 85 percent 
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Table 3 provides an example summary of random point 
values demonstrating the computation of the Student Mastery 
Level Percents. 
Table 3. An example of a summary table of point values for 
random Student Mastery Level Percents of 80, 84, 92, 
97, and 100 
STUDENT MASTERY LEVEL PERCENT POINT VALUE 
100 33.00 
97 29.55 
92 23.80 
84 14.60 
80 10.00 
Adjusted Average Class Size 
The Adjusted Average Class Size factor will be calculated 
as a part of the Student Achievement factor. However, a 
resultant numeric value will be used only if the Adjusted 
Average Class Size exceeds the district determined class size 
maximum established by district policy and practices. 
Additional attention will be given classes that ordinarily 
have more or less students such as band, choir, physical 
education, industrial arts, and home economics. The 
predetermined maximum class size for this study's examples 
will be 28 students. Since the Student Mastery Level factor 
is worth the maximum value of the Student Achievement factor 
of 33 points, an Adjusted Average Class Size value will be 
added to the Student Mastery Level factor when applicable. 
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The Adjusted Average Class Size will be determined for 
each teacher. The Adjusted Average Class Size is an average 
across an individual teacher's class enrollments; adjustments 
are made by assigning a predetermined value to each student 
dependent upon the student's academic placement. Table 4 
delineates the weight assigned for each student category. The 
variable weights represent an estimated quantitative value 
associated with the additional classroom and extracurricular 
time required to meet the specific behavioral and academic 
needs of the identified students (e.g.. preparing specialized 
materials, re-teaching and/or individualizing instruction, 
conferring with parents, etc.). 
Table 4. Weight indicator assigned for each category of 
student 
CATEGORY WEIGHT INDICATOR 
Regular Education 
Chapter 1 
Gifted and Talented 
Specific Learning Disabled 
Mentally Retarded 
Seriously Emotionally Disturbed 
Speech/Language Impaired 
Visually Impaired 
1.0 
1.5 
1.5 
2.0 
3.0 
3.5 
1.5 
2.0 
4.0 
2.0 
4.0 
2.0 
2.0 
Blind 
Hearing Impaired 
Deaf 
Orthopedically Impaired 
Other Health Impaired 
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Adjusted Average Class Size computation 
The Adjusted Average Class Size will be calculated for 
each teacher. It is computed by first assigning each student 
a weighted indicator appropriate for his/her educational 
status as per an Individual Education Plan, district program, 
or regular education placement. Care must be taken to insure 
student confidentiality. A student can only be assigned one 
weighted indicator per class/subject matter; the category with 
the largest weight will be assigned. For example, if a 
student is both Hearing Impaired (2.0) and Seriously 
Emotionally Disturbed (3.5), the student would receive the 
weight of 3.5. Also, if a student in a self-contained 
classroom is Specific Learning Disabled for math, his/her 
weight will be adjusted for that math class only; he/she will 
be assigned other weighted indicators as appropriate for 
his/her other subject matters with the same teacher. 
The teacher's Adjusted Average Class Size (Figure 7) will 
be computed by adding all the students' weights for all of a 
teacher's classes (adjusted class size) and dividing by the 
number of classes/subject matters the teacher instructs. If 
the Adjusted Average Class Size exceeds the district's ceiling 
of 28, a factor of .05 will be multiplied to the difference 
between the teacher's Adjusted Average Class Size and the 
district ceiling of 28. This product will then be added to 
the teacher's Student Achievement Score. 
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In Figure 1, the teacher with these two classes has an 
Adjusted Average Class Size of 5.5. Since 5.5 is below the 
district average of 28, the teacher would not receive any 
extra points to be added to his/her Student Achievement score. 
Formula; 
SUM OF STUDENTS' WEIGHTS / # OF TEACHER'S 
FOR ALL CLASSES / CLASSES 
Example Data (abbreviated example for two classes): 
STUDENT CATEGORY WEIGHT 
ENGLISH 11 
John B. regular education 1.0 
Mary T. visually impaired 2.0 
Sue S. regular education 1.0 
Tom F. specific learning disabled 2.0 
ENGLISH 9 
Fred S. Chapter 1 1.5 
Alice B. regular education 1.0 
Jane H. Chapter 1 1.5 
Joe P. regular education 1.0 
Adjusted Class Size 11.0 
Calculation Example: 
11.0 / 2 = 5.5 
Figure 7. Formula and computation of the Adjusted Average 
Class Size 
In Figure 8, the Teacher's Adjusted Average Class Size is 
34, six students over the district maximum. Thus, the teacher 
would receive an additional 3 points added to his/her Student 
Achievement Score for an adjusted total Student Achievement 
Score of 30. 
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Formula: 
Teacher's 
(Adjusted Average - District Maximum) (.05) = B 
Class Size Average Class Size 
Example Data; 
Teacher's Adjusted Average Class Size = 34 
District Maximum Average Class Size = 28 
Calculation Example: 
(34 - 28) X .05 = 6 X .05 = 3 
Figure 8. Example o f  Adjusted Average Class Size over the 
district predetermined maximum level 
Exemptions to the Student Achievement Score Calculations 
Predictably during the school year, students move between 
different academic and/or behavioral classifications. 
Likewise, a student may be placed in an inappropriate class: 
a student may be placed in a class by his/her parents or 
guardians against school district recommendations, or a 
student may become eligible for Special Education placement. 
Student Placement 
To guard against any inappropriate placement affecting a 
teacher's Student Achievement Score, a Student Placement 
Review Team will be established for each school site. The 
Student Placement Review Team will consist of a school site 
administrator, school district psychologist, special education 
teacher, regular education teacher, and the student's 
counselor. 
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Since the teacher will be monitoring all students' 
progress, if a behavioral or academic problem arises, it is 
the responsibility of the teacher to initiate appropriate 
intervention strategies for the student. At such time as 
classroom strategies prove to be ineffective, the teacher may 
request a Student Placement Review Team meeting. The Student 
Placement Review Team will ensure proper and immediate review 
of a student placement upon the request from a teacher. The 
Student Placement Review Team will conduct a meeting in which 
the initiating teacher will present the documentation 
substantiating the concerns of the inappropriate placement and 
the intervention strategies attempted. In cases where a 
student is experiencing difficulties in more than one class, 
all the effected teachers will present appropriate data 
concerning the student's progress. 
As a result of the Student Placement Review Team meeting, 
if a student is referred to a Special Education placement, the 
student will be assigned the corresponding weighted indicator, 
thus adjusting the class size formula. Likewise, the 
student's Individualized Education Plan will supersede the 
original district's Student Mastery Level Criteria. 
If the student is not placed in another weighted 
category, the Student Placement Review Team will recommend 
additional strategies to be implemented to help the student 
learn the course objectives. If the student continues to 
experience difficulties, the teacher must request a second 
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Student Placement Review Team meeting; if the Student 
Placement Review Team finds the teacher has exhausted his/her 
efforts in providing appropriate interventions, it will 
designate the student as "exempt." The exempt status 
eliminates the use of the student's test scores, thus 
excluding the student from the computation of the teacher's 
Student Mastery Level Score. 
Student attendance 
Assuming students are placed in the appropriate academic 
and/or skill level classes, the attendance rate of students is 
directly related to the potential level of content mastery. 
The district will predetermine a student attendance rate that 
will indicate at what point students will be excluded from the 
teachers' Student Mastery Level Scores. For this study, a 
student attendance rate of 90 percent will be used. A student 
in attendance for each class for a minimum of 162 days (90 
percent of the average 180 day school year is 162; this number 
of days would be halved for semester classes), as verified by 
official school attendance records, will be designated as non-
exempt. The non-exempt status will result in the inclusion of 
the student's test scores in the computation of the 
teacher's/s' Student Mastery Level Score. An exemption will 
apply to all home study placements and pre-arranged 
educational leaves. 
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Transferred students 
Any student transferring into a class or school 20 school 
days after the beginning of the class will be designated as 
exempt. Students leaving a class before the mastery test has 
been administered will be designated as exempt. The transfer 
student exemption status will result in the exclusion of the 
student's test score from the calculation of the teacher's/s' 
Student Mastery Level Score. 
Other considerations 
The Westonlee School District Stakeholders' Committee 
outlined a number of parameters to be included in the 
development of the weighing of the Student Achievement factor. 
The constraints included heterogeneous versus homogeneous 
grouping, age level, elective versus required course, and type 
of student enrolled in the course. 
The educational effects from these perceived constraints 
will be dissipated as a function of the testing process and 
the student weighing. Each criterion referenced test is 
designed to reflect the age level, reading level, and 
comprehension level of that student population. Likewise, the 
type of course, elective versus required, will not alter the 
performance on a course specific test. Additionally, if these 
factors would in any way consistently affect test performance, 
it would be so indicated on the initial administrations of the 
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test, from which the district norms and Student Mastery Level 
Criteria will be established. 
The type of students and the heterogeneous or homogeneous 
groupings are accounted for in the weighing of the Adjusted 
Average Class Size factor. Additional weight is added to 
identified students requiring greater teacher effort and 
instruction attention. 
Constraints Report 
Extenuating circumstances may arise when considering 
Student Achievement. To protect against any unforeseen 
situation impacting a teacher's Student Achievement results, a 
Constraints Report will be available. A teacher who does not 
qualify for Pay for Performance compensation due to a low 
Student Achievement Score may submit a Constraints Report. 
The Constraints Report will provide the teacher with a vehicle 
to describe and explain the reasons for the Student 
Achievement results and rationale for consideration for 
adjusting the Teacher's Student Achievement Score. 
The Constraints Report will be initiated by the teacher 
and submitted to the site administrator by April 15. The site 
administrator will review and render a decision within five 
working days upon receipt of the report. If the teacher is 
not satisfied with the findings of the site administrator, the 
teacher may appeal to the Pay for Performance Review Team. 
The teacher has ten working days from the receipt of the 
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administrator's decision to file the Constraints Report's 
appeal to the Pay for Performance Review Team. 
Student Feedback Report Factor 
The Student Feedback Report factor of the Westonlee 
School District Pay for Performance Plan will consist entirely 
of the Westonlee School District Student Feedback to Teachers 
Questionnaire (Appendix F). The instrument was developed for 
its use in providing teachers with current and specific 
feedback from their students on teaching practices, classroom 
discipline and teacher/student interaction. 
Four separate questionnaires are used: lower elementary 
(K-2), upper elementary (3-6), middle school (6-8), and the 
senior high school (9-12). The instruments focus on areas of 
teaching that specifically represent the nature and style of 
instruction and student learning suitable for each level. 
Each instrument has been written to reflect the appropriate 
reading, vocabulary, and comprehension level. Response modes 
are, likewise, appropriate for the target level. 
Questionnaire items were selected from an item bank which have 
been researched for reliability and discrimination power 
(Judkins, 1986). 
For the purpose of rating consistency, only the items 
appearing across all four of the instruments will be used. 
These nine items are selected as district-wide items which 
cover the topics of motivation, fairness, teacher preparation. 
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presenting, caring, and summarizing. Since tabulation of the 
results for the Pay for Performance Plan will use only these 
identified items, individual teacher or department items will 
not be included in the Pay for Performance Plan analysis since 
they have not been researched for reliability or 
discriminating power. 
The questionnaire response mode assigns a one (1) for the 
highest response and a five (5) for the lowest response. The 
response mode will need to be reversed, five (5) highest 
response and one (1) lowest response, for this study's 
calculation and formula purposes. 
Administration of the Student Feedback to Teacher 
Questionnaire will follow district policies. Questionnaire 
responses from the primary grades will be transferred to 
computer scan sheets while the upper elementary, middle, and 
high school will respond directly onto scan sheets. The 
questionnaires will be machine scored and tabulated by a non-
certificated and confidential employee. Resultant mean scores 
will be forwarded for further tabulation and inclusion within 
the overall Teacher's Composite Pay for Performance Score 
formula. All questionnaires will be returned to the 
individual teacher for further personal analysis. 
Student Feedback Report Factor computation 
The Student Feedback Report constitutes one-sixth, or 17 
points, of the total Teacher's Composite Score. The 
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calculation of the point distribution (Figure 9) will be made 
against a district-wide mean score determined annually. The 
predetermined range of points of 10 (17 the high, 7 the low) 
will be distributed equally along the upper half of the 
score's continuum starting with the baseline of 7 being 
assigned to the district mean score and ending with 17 
assigned to a score of 45 (100 percent of a possible score of 
45 points). As illustrated in Figure 9, by dividing the range 
by the difference between the top possible score of 45 and the 
district mean score, the resultant is a point value constant 
of .67. It is awarded to every score point above the 
calculated district mean. 
Formula;" 
RANGE / (45-DISTRICT MEAN) = C 
Example Data: 
District Mean =30 
Calculation Example: 
(17 - 7) / (45 - 30) = 10 / 15 = .67 
Figure 9. Formula and computation for determining the point 
value to be assigned for each percentage point 
scored above the district mean 
As presented in Figure 10, by multiplying the derived 
constant of .67 by the difference between the teacher's 
individual score and the district mean and adding this product 
to the baseline point value, an individual scoring 35 would be 
awarded 10.35 points out of a possible 17 points for the 
Student Feedback Report factor. 
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Formula: 
[(C)(INDIVIDUAL SCORE-DISTRICT MEAN)] + BASELINE POINT VALUE 
Example Data: 
District Mean =30 Individual Score =35 
Baseline Point Value = 7 
Calculation Example: 
[(.67) (35 - 30)] + 7 = [(.67) (5)] + 7 = 
3.35 + 7 = 10.35 
Figure 10. Formula and example computation for determining 
the point value earned for the Student Feedback 
Report factor 
Additional scores and point values are presented in 
summary Table 5. The table illustrates the point values 
associated with the high and low scores. 
Continuing Professional Growth Schedule 
The keystone of the Westonlee School District Pay for 
Performance Plan is the Continuing Professional Growth 
Schedule (Table 6). The Continuing Professional Growth 
Schedule is the conceptual matrix representing teacher 
professional growth attained as they gain experience and 
progress through the schedule. The Continuing Professional 
Growth Schedule serves two purposes; (1) as an outline of 
eligibility criteria associated with the differentiated 
compensation ranges, and (2) as a model representing the 
professional activities teachers engage in during a career as 
a teacher. Westonlee School District regards teachers as the 
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Table 5. An example of Student Feedback Report factor 
summary table using the same district mean of 30, 
for the random scores of 45, 40, 35, and 30 
integral asset in providing quality education to the students 
the district serves. The Continuing Professional Growth 
Schedule reflects the Stakeholders' Committee and Board of 
Education's belief that teaching, as with all true 
professions, requires continual professional development, and 
thus, should be compensated accordingly. 
The Continuing Professional Growth Schedule outlines a 
number of criteria that teachers must fulfill to earn pay for 
performance compensation. The areas include: Years of 
Experience; Formal Observations per year; Unannounced 
Observations per year; Semester Graduate Hours or Advanced 
Degree; Professional Activities Report; and Teacher's 
Composite Score Range. A teacher must meet or exceed each 
criterion for Pay for Performance eligibility. 
SCORE POINT VALUE 
45 
40 
35 
30 
17.0 
13.7 
10.35 
7.0 
90 
Table 6. An example of the Continuing Professional Growth 
Schedule 
Years of Experience 1-3 years 4-6 years 7-9 years 10 + years 
Formal Observations per Year 4 2 2 2 
Unannounced Observations 
per Year 
3 3 2 2 
Semester Graduate Hours or 
Advanced Degree 
2 per year; 
Total of 6 
by 3rd year 
2 per year; 
Total of 12 by 
6th year 
2 per year; 
Total of 18 by 
9th year 
Master's 
Degree 
Professional Activities Report 
1st year; 1 
2nd year; 2 
3rd year; 3 
3 per year 
3 per year for 
2 of 3 years; 
peer coaching 
and 1 activity 
the remaining 
year 
3 per year, 
or 2 and peer 
coaching or 
mentor 
teacher 
proiect 
Teacher's Composite Score Range 70-100 75-100 80-100 85-100 
"Years of Experience" 
Each compensation range is associated with a range of 
"Years of Experience." The ranges of "Years of Experience" 
are: one to three years, four to six years, seven to nine 
years, and ten or more years. The district will place all new 
teachers without teaching experience in the first year range. 
The district will award credit for new teachers with previous 
teaching experience after the successful completion of a 
probationary year. A teacher successfully completes a 
probationary year by meeting or exceeding all the Continuing 
Professional Growth Schedule criteria for the one to three 
"Years of Experience" range. At that time, the teacher will 
receive the compensation appropriate for that range and 
his/her Teacher's Composite Score. The teacher can then 
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proceed to the "Years of Experience" range appropriate for the 
teacher's total years of teaching experience. 
Formal observations/Teacher Performance Evaluation 
All participants will be formally observed twice every 
year. The Continued Professional Growth Schedule observations 
can simultaneously fulfill the required observations for those 
teachers on the Teacher Performance Evaluation Cycle and where 
temporary or probationary teachers are required to be observed 
more frequently, as per the teacher contract and state 
mandates. 
Compliance to the Westonlee School District Teacher 
Performance Evaluation process will be maintained for the 
Continued Professional Growth Schedule. All observations will 
be conducted by trained district-certified administrators. A 
mutually determined schedule for pre-observation conference, 
observation, and post-observation conference will constitute a 
completed observation cycle. Data gathered from the 
observations will: (1) be used to reinforce the teacher for 
instructional strengths, (2) provide guidance and 
instructional modeling for areas in need of strengthening, and 
(3) be used as an information base for evaluation. 
Unannounced observations 
Unannounced classroom observations will also be used as a 
source for evaluative data collecting. The Continued 
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Professional Growth Schedule requires two unannounced 
observations per year. Unannounced observations can be 
considered unannounced walk-through observations focused on 
any aspect of the teaching experience, classroom management, 
or other teacher related responsibilities. Formal post-
conferencing is not required, but some form of professional 
feedback is encouraged. 
Graduate hours/advanced degrees 
True professions encourage the continued pursuit of 
academic training, professional growth, and new trends; 
teaching is no exception. The Continued Professional Growth 
Schedule outlines a differentiated scale for the graduate hour 
requirements associated with the "Years of Experience" ranges. 
Guidelines for approval of courses will follow the current 
district policy. All approved courses will be directly 
related to instructional methodology, curriculum development, 
management systems, the teacher's specific area of 
instruction, and/or a part of a formal graduate education 
degree program. Every course will require pre-approval for 
admittance toward the Continued Professional Growth Schedule 
requirement. The site administrator will be responsible for 
approving course selections. 
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Professional Activities Report 
The Professional Activities Report is the focus of the 
Continued Professional Growth Schedule and is intended to 
extend the professional growth of the educator. A teacher 
will participate in a specified number of approved activities 
depending upon his/her "Years of Experience" range. All 
activities will be pre-approved by the site administrator. In 
the case of an activity that may require involvement or 
support from another source outside of the school site, the 
appropriate district office administrator will confer with the 
teacher and administrator prior to approval (e.g.. a teacher 
developing district curriculum units will work directly with 
the responsible district office level administrator). 
Activities will directly relate to curriculum development, 
instructional methodologies, management systems, student 
programs or activities, staff development activities, or at-
risk student programs. Other specific areas of teacher 
interest or school district need may warrant other activities; 
proposals will address the educational benefit, purpose, cost, 
specific goals and objectives to be met, procedures for 
implementation, and evaluation standards. 
Teachers in the 7-9 "Years of Experience" range will 
participate as Peer Coaches during at least one of the three 
years. The district implementation of a Peer Coaching program 
will provide additional instructional leadership and a 
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supportive staff development program by utilizing experienced 
and successful teachers as peer coaches. 
A list of example activities follows: 
1. Successfully complete an inservice course conducted by 
the Westonlee School District or other educational 
agency. 
2. Plan, coordinate, or conduct an approved pilot study or 
project. 
3. Attend a district approved instructional conference and 
presentation inservice to appropriate district staff. 
4. Prepare and publish an article of academic nature in a 
professional educator's journal. 
5. Successfully complete re-certification procedures by 
National Teacher Examination in a field not currently 
certified. 
6. Serve as a non-remunerated sponsor of a student club, 
organization, forensic, or athletic activity. 
7. Regularly assist in planning/conducting approved school 
or district-wide student activities or programs. 
8. Prepare and demonstrate/present an exemplary unit of 
study for district teachers' use fi.e.. 4th grade science 
unit). 
9. Create and demonstrate/present an exemplary management 
system for district teachers' use fi.e., computer 
assisted grading). 
10. Create and/or gather and catalog with district librarian, 
supplementary curricular materials. 
11. Develop school/district handbook, manual, or brochure. 
12. Develop and implement a major unit of instruction that 
employees articulated academic goals and objectives and 
innovative teacher behaviors which represent a higher 
level of teaching skills extending the participating 
teacher's instructional expertise. 
13. Demonstrate an exemplary cooperative effort by sharing 
materials/methods with other designated teachers in an 
organized and documented Cooperative Teacher Group. 
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14. Serve as a member of a district-wide study, curriculum, 
or planning committee. 
15. Serve as a member of a special problems or curriculum 
development workshop. 
16. Serve in a leadership capacity in planning and/or 
conducting one or more inservice programs. 
17. Serve as a member of a school self-study committee or as 
a chairman of one of its subcommittees. 
18. Serve in a leadership capacity in a district, state, or 
national professional teacher organization directly 
related to the teacher's assignment. 
19. Serve as a Peer Coach. 
20. Serve as a cooperating teacher for university placed 
student teachers. 
21. Serve as a department, curriculum, or grade level 
chairperson. 
MOTE: The activities and services are not limited to the 
aforementioned. Other professional involvement or 
instructional activities shall be considered on the basis of 
their direct value to the students, staff, schools, the school 
district, and/or the education profession. 
Teacher's Composite Score 
To qualify for Pay for Performance compensation, 
participants will need to meet or exceed a predetermined score 
for the Teacher's Composite Score. Each "Years of Experience" 
range will require a different score increasing as the "Years 
of Experience" increase, justified by the expectation of 
increased teacher expertise in the many facets of the 
professional teacher (not limited to the teaching episode 
exclusively). 
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As presented in Figure 11, the Teacher's Composite Score is 
the sum of the three weighted factors: Supervisor's Rating, 
Student Achievement, and Student Feedback Report. As 
computed, the Teacher's Composite Score is 70.03. 
Formula; 
Supervisor's Student Student Teacher's 
Rating + Achievement + Feedback = Composite 
Score Score Score Score 
Example Data: 
Supervisor's Rating Score = 38.13 
Student Achievement Score = 21.55 
Student Feedback Score = 10.35 
Calculation Example: 
38.13 + 21.55 + 10.35 = 70.03 
Figure 11. Formula and example computation of the Teacher's 
Composite Score 
Other Procedural Considerations 
The Pay for Performance Plan provides teachers with due 
process. In addition to built-in due process, addressed in 
the Teacher Performance Evaluation Procedures, the Pay for 
Performance Plan establishes procedures to guarantee the 
review of the outcomes derived from the factor data. 
Pay for Performance Review Team 
A Pay for Performance Review Team will be established to 
review and take action on teacher concerns and appeals. The 
Pay for Performance Review Team will be a district advisory 
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committee with the superintendent having final decision­
making responsibility. The Review Team will consist of five 
(5) teachers and three (3) administrators. Three teachers and 
the administrators will represent each level; a teacher and 
administrator per elementary, junior high, and senior high 
school levels. The two remaining teachers will be at-large 
representatives. It is recommended that one of the at-large 
teachers currently teach at the same level as the teacher 
making the appeal, but he/she should not teach at the same 
school. Thus, a pool of teachers will be established for the 
at-large positions and the teachers will rotate through this 
assignment. 
Appointments to the Pay for Performance Review Team will 
be made by the Board of Education based upon recommendations 
from the superintendent for administrators, and the teachers' 
union for the teacher representatives. Term of appointment, 
and committee logistics will be consistent with district 
policies and past practices, and determined by the 
Stakeholders' Committee. 
Appeals process 
An appeals process is guaranteed within the Pay for 
Performance Plan. Its sole purpose is to provide a teacher 
with internal due process; a means to insure consistent 
application and administration of the Pay for Performance 
Plan. To this end, the Pay for Performance Plan's appeals 
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process is a systematic and timely review of the teacher's 
concerns. A teacher does not relinquish any of his/her legal 
rights or responsibilities when pursuing a review of his/her 
concerns. 
Two areas of appeal specifically outlined in the Pay for 
Performance Plan are the teacher's supervisor's evaluation and 
the approval of the teacher's Continuing Professional Growth 
Schedule. However, the appeals process is not limited to 
these areas; any concerns regarding procedure, implementation, 
and/or rating may be appealed. 
A teacher completing the Pay for Performance process who 
wishes to appeal the summative evaluation. Professional 
Activities Report, or final Teacher's Composite Score, may, 
within five (5) working days of the receipt of his/her 
evaluation, request a review of the evaluation with the 
principal. The review conference will be scheduled within 
five (5) working days from the receipt of the request. If the 
teacher is not satisfied with the review results, the teacher 
may, within five (5) working days of the review conference, 
submit a written appeal to the superintendent requesting a Pay 
for Performance Review Team hearing. The appeal is forwarded 
to the Pay for Performance Review Team. Within twenty (20) 
working days, the Pay for Performance Review Team will review 
the appeal, a decision will be rendered and forwarded to the 
superintendent for the final decision. 
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The teacher can request either an informal review of the 
appeal in which just the documentation is reviewed, or he/she 
may request a formal hearing in which he/she presents the 
appeal and documentation. The presentation will be limited to 
the teacher onlv; witnesses, cross-examination, and/or legal 
representation is not permitted. The decision of the 
superintendent is final. 
A teacher who is dissatisfied with the decision pursuant 
to this appeals process may submit a brief, concise written 
statement rebutting or objecting to said decision; the 
statement shall become a part of the teacher's permanent 
employment file. 
Participation 
Beginning in the 1990-1991 school year, all teachers will 
participate in the Westonlee School District Pay for 
Performance Program. It is expected that the range of 
compensations and the opportunities for professional growth 
will provide incentives for experienced teachers to assume 
leadership roles. 
Application process 
The application process will consist of the Pay for 
Performance application form submitted by the end of the last 
week of September of the current school year. The Pay for 
Performance application will closely follow the format 
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represented by the Continuing Professional Growth Schedule. 
The Professional Activities Report will be included in the 
application; teachers will indicate the objectives, timelines, 
rationale, evaluation processes, and other pertinent 
information for their proposed professional activities. 
A designated site administrator and the teacher will 
review the application during the first two weeks of October. 
If a teacher's professional activity requires approval prior 
to the review deadline (e.g.. conference registration), it is 
the teacher's responsibility to schedule and meet with the 
administrator within the activity's timeline, to ascertain 
appropriate activity approval for that particular activity; 
the Continuing Professional Growth Schedule can be reviewed 
later within the October timeline. Final approval and/or 
modification will be the responsibility of the administrator. 
If agreement cannot be reached, the teacher may appeal 
the decision to the Pay for Performance Review Team within 
five working days upon receipt of the application denial. All 
effort will be made to collaboratively reach consensus on 
proposed Professional Activities Reports. It is understood 
that in some cases, student needs, breadth of educational 
value, district needs, and district ability to provide 
resources will dictate restricted implementation of proposed 
activities. Prudent administrative practices and district 
policies will provide guidelines for balanced and equitable 
Professional Activities approval. 
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Movement across Continuing Professional Growth Schedule 
A teacher with the appropriate "Years of Experience" who 
successfully completes the required criteria outlined in the 
Continuing Professional Growth Schedule and who meets the 
minimum district percent for the Teacher's Composite Score may 
progress to the next "Years of Experience" level. The 
application process is the same for all participants. 
A teacher not maintaining or improving upon his/her 
performance will return to the previous "Years of Experience" 
level and not be eligible for compensation. An administrative 
review will take place to determine appropriate professional 
growth activities for successful completion of the newly 
assigned level. 
Leave of absence/sabbatical 
A teacher taking a district approved leave of absence 
will maintain his/her status upon return to a classroom 
assignment. A teacher taking a sabbatical leave will maintain 
his/her Pay for Performance Plan status upon returning to a 
classroom assignment unless he/she can meet the next level's 
criteria. During the teacher's sabbatical year, he/she will 
earn the salary commensurate with district policy and his/her 
previous year's Pay for Performance status. 
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CHAPTER IV. FINDINGS 
Now that the model has been developed, the feasibility of 
the plan will be determined by projecting the financial impact 
of the plan in terms of teacher compensation. A cost analysis 
matrix will be developed to demonstrate the differentiated 
levels of merit expenditures. Since the financial commitment 
will vary with each school district, one hypothetical salary 
schedule will be offered for comparison; multiple examples 
will be generated to illustrate the combinations of differing 
levels of experience, staffing, evaluation results, and 
compensation ranges. Eligibility for compensation is based on 
two factors; 1) successfully completing the Continuing 
Professional Growth Schedule as per the appropriate "Years of 
Experience", and 2) attaining a Teacher's Composite Score at 
or above the predetermined Teacher's Composite Score Range as 
per appropriate "Years of Experience." 
Chapter IV will first present the Teacher Composite Score 
matrices. These matrices will provide the potential number of 
teachers qualifying for compensation by using samples of 
Teacher's Composite Scores and by considering various 
Teacher's Composite Score Ranges. Secondly, the Westonlee 
School District Salary Schedule and a cost analysis by 
Compensation Ranges will be provided to illustrate the 
potential financial impact for the hypothetical school 
district. Finally, formulas and examples will demonstrate how 
the individual teacher's compensation will be calculated. 
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Teacher's Composite Score Matrices 
The Teacher's Composite Score matrices are represented on 
Tables 8, 9, 10, and 11. The Teacher's Composite Score 
matrices were developed to (1) illustrate the hypothetical 
combinations of the minimum, average, and maximum scores using 
each of the Teacher's Composite Score factors (Supervisor's 
Rating, Student Achievement, and Student Feedback), and (2) 
help approximate how many teachers may qualify for merit pay 
based on their Teacher's Composite Score. 
Tables 8, 9, 10, and 11 demonstrate the possible 
Teacher's Composite Scores based on the minimum, average, and 
maximum scores for Supervisor's Rating—33.32, 41.66, and 50; 
Student Achievement—10, 21.50, and 33; and Student Feedback— 
7, 12, and 17, respectively. The results of the various 
combinations of scores, derived by adding together one 
representative score from each factor, are compared against 
the Teacher's Composite Score Range. The inclusion of the 
"average" score per factor helps estimate how "average" scores 
fare against the Teacher's Composite Score Ranges. The 
Teacher's Composite Score Ranges vary for each of the tables 
and represent ranges of compensation reflecting existing 
plans. In practice, the appropriate range would be 
predetermined as part of the Continuing Professional Growth 
Schedule and be represented by the "Years of Experience" 
categories. As an example. Table 8 demonstrates the Teacher's 
Composite Score Ranges: 70-100 for one to three "Years of 
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Experience", 75-100 for four to six "Years of Experience", 80-
100 for seven to nine "Years of Experience", and 85-100 for 
ten or more "Years of Experience." Thus, one can determine 
the range of Teacher's Composite Scores that would qualify for 
merit pay. 
As represented in Tables 8, 9, 10, and 11, those scores 
above the Teacher's Composite Score Range minimum and 
qualifying for compensation are noted with a "Y" as compared 
to those scores not within the score range and not qualifying 
as designated with an "N." As exemplified on Table 8, a 
teacher in the one to three "Years of Experience" category 
(70-100 Teacher Composite Score Range) and receiving a 33.32 
(minimum) on the Supervisor's Rating, a 21.50 (average) for 
Student Achievement, and a 17 (maximum) for Student Feedback, 
would earn a Teacher's Composite Score of 71.82 and qualify 
for merit compensation. 
Tables 8 through 11 also provide the number and percent 
of scores qualifying per each Teacher's Composite Score Range, 
and the total number and percent of the qualifying scores for 
all ranges. In Table 8, 67 percent or 18 scores would qualify 
in the 70-100 score range; 52 percent or 14 scores for 75-100; 
37 percent or 10 scores for 80-100; and 22 percent or 6 scores 
for the 85-100 Teacher's Composite Score Range. Overall, 44 
percent or 48 scores would qualify from all ranges represented 
in Table 8. Likewise, the aforementioned results are also 
provided with comparisons to Tables 9, 10, and 11 on the 
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summary Table 7. The value of these tables is the estimate of 
the number and percent of scores qualifying. It is understood 
that the inclusion of the "average" score is not necessary to 
provide the range of combination of scores; however, the 
"average" scores help further establish a benchmark for 
review. 
Table 7. Summary table of Tables 8, 9, 10, and 11 of the 
Teacher's Composite Score matrices presenting a 
comparison of the total number and percent of 
qualifying teachers by the Years of 
Experience/Teacher's Composite Score Ranges 
1-3 
Years 
4-6 
Years 
7-9 
Years 
10+ 
Years 
Total # per Range Total X per Range 
Table 8 70-100 75-100 80-100 85-100 
# X 18 67 14 52 10 37 6 22 48 44 
Tab le 9 60-100 70-100 so­100 90-100 
« X 24 89 18 67 lo 37 4 15 56 52 
Tab! e 10 60-100 70-100 75-100 80-100 
# X 24 89 18 67 14 52 10 37 66 61 
Table 11 50-100 60-100 70-100 so­100 
# X 27 10 
0 
25 93 18 67 lo 37 80 74 
Multiple combinations of Teacher's Composite Score Ranges 
are presented to illustrate how the total number and percent 
of qualifying scores differ. As the Teacher's Composite Score 
Ranges become more liberal with lower minimum scores, a 
greater number of scores qualify. 
Table 8. Matrix of 
Composite 
Scores by 
minimum, average, and 
Scores for qualifying 
Ranges of 70, 75, 80, 
maximum Teacher's 
Teacher's Composite 
and 85 
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Supervisor's 
Rating 
Student 
Achievement 
Student 
Feedbac k 
Teacher 
Composite 
Score 
Qua 
Compos 
Yet 
lifying Teache 
>ite Score Rang 
irs of Experien 
r's 
e by 
ce 
Min Avg Max Min Avg Max Min Avg Max 
Years 1-3 4-6 7-9 10+ 
Score 
Range 100 
75-
100 
80-
100 
85-
100 
33.32 10 7 50.32 N N N 
33.32 21.50 7 61.82 Y N N N 
33.32 33 7 73.32 Y N N N 
33.32 10 12 55.32 N N N 
33.32 21.50 12 66.82 Y N N N 
33.32 33 12 78.32 Y Y N N 
33.32 10 17 60.32 N N N 
33.32 21.50 17 71.82 Y N N N 
33.32 33 17 83.32 Y Y Y N 
41.66 10 7 58.66 N N N 
41.66 21.50 7 70.16 Y N N N 
41.66 33 7 81.66 Y Y Y N 
41.66 10 12 63.66 N N N 
41.66 21.50 12 75.16 Y Y Y N 
41.66 33 12 86.66 Y Y Y Y 
41.66 10 17 68.66 N N N 
41.66 21.50 17 80.16 Y Y Y N 
41.66 33 17 91.66 Y Y Y Y 
50 10 7 67.00 N N N 
50 21.50 7 78.50 Y Y N N 
50 33 7 90.00 Y Y Y Y 
50 10 12 72.00 Y Y N N 
50 21.50 12 83.50 Y Y Y N 
50 33 12 95.00 Y Y Y Y 
50 10 17 77.00 Y Y N N 
50 21.50 17 88.50 Y Y Y Y 
50 33 17 100.00 Y Y Y Y 
# ser Range 18 14 10 6 
Teacher's Composite Scores 
Qualifying for Compensation by 
Teacher's Composite Score Ranges 
% per Range 67 52 37 22 
Total for Ranges # 48 X 44 
Table 9. Matrix of 
Composite 
Scores by 
minimum, average, and 
Scores for qualifying 
Ranges of 60, 70, 80, 
maximum Teacher's 
Teacher's Composite 
and 90 
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Supervisor's 
Rating 
Student 
Achievement 
Student 
Feedback 
Teacher 
Composi te 
Score 
Qualifying Teacher's 
Composite Score Range by 
Years of Experience 
Min Avg Max Min Avg Max Min Avg Max 
Years 1-3 4-6 7-9 10+ 
Score 
Range 
60-
100 
70-
100 
80-
100 
90-
100 
33.32 10 7 50.32 N N N N 
33.32 21.50 7 61.82 Y N N N 
33.32 33 7 73.32 Y Y N N 
33.32 10 12 55.32 H N N N 
33.32 21.50 12 66.82 N N N 
33.32 33 12 78.32 Y Y N N 
33.32 10 17 60.32 Y N N N 
33.32 21.50 17 71.82 Y Y N N 
33.32 33 17 83.32 Y Y Y N 
41.66 10 7 58.66 N N N 
41.66 21.50 7 70.16 Y Y N N 
41.66 33 7 81.66 Y Y Y N 
41.66 10 12 63.66 N N N 
41.66 21.50 12 75.16 Y Y N N 
41.66 33 12 86.66 Y Y Y N 
41.66 10 17 68.66 Y N N N 
41.66 21.50 17 80.16 Y Y Y N 
41.66 33 17 91.66 Y Y Y Y 
50 10 7 67.00 Y N N N 
50 21.50 7 78.50 Y Y N N 
50 33 7 90.00 Y Y Y Y 
50 10 12 72.00 Y Y N N 
50 21.50 12 83.50 Y Y Y N 
50 33 12 95.00 Y Y Y Y 
50 10 17 77.00 Y Y N N 
50 21.50 17 88.50 Y Y Y N 
50 33 17 100.00 Y Y Y Y 
Teacher's Composite Scores 
Qualifying for Compensation by 
Teacher's Composite Score Ranges 
* per Range 24 18 10 4 
X per Range 89 67 37 15 
Total for Ranges # 56 X 52 
Table 10. Matrix of 
Composite 
Scores by 
minimum, average, and 
Scores for qualifying 
Ranges of 60, 70, 75, 
maximum Teacher's 
Teacher's Composite 
and 80 
Ill 
Supervisor's 
Rating 
Student 
Achievement 
Student 
Feedbac k 
Teacher 
Composite 
Score 
Qua 
Compos 
Yet 
lifying Teacher's 
iite Score Range by 
irs of Experience 
Min Avg Max Min Avg Max Min Avg Max 
Years 1-3 4-6 7-9 10+ 
Score 
Range 
60-
100 
70-
100 
75-
100 
80-
100 
33.32 10 7 50.32 N N N N 
33.32 21.50 7 61.82 Y N N N 
33.32 33 7 73.32 Y Y N N 
33.32 10 12 55.32 N N 
33.32 21.50 12 66.82 Y N N 
33.32 33 12 78.32 Y Y Y N 
33.32 10 17 60.32 Y N N 
33.32 21.50 17 71.82 Y Y N N 
33.32 33 17 83.32 Y Y Y Y 
41.66 10 7 58.66 N ' N 
41.66 21.50 7 70.16 Y Y N N 
41.66 33 7 81.66 Y Y Y Y 
41.66 10 12 63.66 Y N N 
41.66 21.50 12 75.16 Y Y Y N 
41.66 33 12 86.66 Y Y Y Y 
41.66 10 17 68.66 Y N N 
41.66 21.50 17 80.16 Y Y Y Y 
41.66 33 17 91.66 Y Y Y Y 
50 10 7 67.00 Y N N 
50 21.50 7 78.50 Y Y Y N 
50 33 7 90.00 Y Y Y Y 
50 10 12 72.00 Y Y N N 
50 21.50 12 83.50 Y Y Y Y 
50 33 12 95.00 Y Y Y Y 
50 10 17 77.00 Y Y Y N 
50 21.50 17 88.50 Y Y Y Y 
50 33 17 100.00 Y Y Y Y 
Teacher's Composite Scores 
Qualifying for Compensation by 
Teacher's Composite Score Ranges 
# per Range 24 18 14 10 
X per Range 89 67 52 37 
Total for Ranges | # 66 % 61 
Table 11, Matrix of 
Composite 
Scores by 
minimum, average, and 
Scores for qualifying 
Ranges of 50, 60, 70, 
maximum Teacher's 
Teacher's Composite 
and 80 
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Supervisor's 
Rating 
Student 
Achievement 
Student 
Feedback 
Teacher 
Composite 
Score 
Qualifying 
Composite See 
Years of E 
Teacher's 
re Range by 
xperience 
Min Avg Max Min Avg Max Min Avg Max 
Years 1-3 4-6 7-9 10+ 
Score 
Range 
50-
100 
60-
100 
70-
100 
80-
100 
33.32 10 7 50.32 Y Y N N 
33.32 21.50 7 61.82 Y Y N N 
33.32 33 7 73.32 Y Y Y N 
33.32 10 12 55.32 Y N N 
33.32 21.50 12 66.82 Y Y N N 
33.32 33 12 78.32 Y Y Y N 
33.32 10 17 60.32 Y Y N N 
33.32 21.50 17 71.82 Y Y Y N 
33.32 33 17 83.32 Y Y Y Y 
41.66 10 7 58.66 Y N N 
41.66 21.50 7 70.16 Y Y Y N 
41.66 33 7 81.66 Y Y Y Y 
41.66 10 12 63.66 Y Y N N 
41.66 21.50 12 75.16 Y Y Y N 
41.66 33 12 86.66 Y Y Y Y 
41.66 10 17 68.66 Y Y N N 
41.66 21.50 17 80.16 Y Y Y Y 
41.66 33 17 91.66 Y Y Y Y 
50 10 7 67.00 Y Y N N 
50 21.50 7 78.50 Y Y Y N 
50 33 7 90.00 Y Y Y Y 
50 10 12 72.00 Y Y Y N 
SO 21.50 12 83.50 Y Y Y Y 
50 33 12 95.00 Y Y Y Y 
50 10 17 77.00 Y Y Y N 
50 21.50 17 88.50 Y Y Y Y 
50 33 17 100.00 Y Y Y Y 
# ser Range 27 25 18 10 
Teacher's Composite Scores 
Qualifying for Compensation by 
Teacher's Composite Score Ranges 
% per Range 100 93 67 37 
Total for Ranges # 80 % 74 
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Westonlee School District Salary Schedule 
For the purpose of this study, a sample salary schedule 
from a school district on the Central Coast of California will 
be used. The financial and staffing scenario realistically 
illustrates the norm for a suburban/rural school district in 
the state. 
The Westonlee School District Salary Schedule, Table 12, 
includes a frequency distribution for each year of employment 
and the level of semester credits awarded. Additionally, the 
frequency for each "Years of Experience" range is presented; 
and the total of all full-time employees (FTE) is designated. 
Of the total 432 teachers, there are 50 PTEs with one to three 
years of experience; 81 PTEs with four to six years of 
experience; 64 PTEs with seven to nine years of experience; 
and 237 PTEs with more than ten years of experience. 
These frequencies accurately represent the trends in 
teacher staffing over the last 20 years. Teaching staff 
frequencies are greatest in the years four to six and with ten 
or more years. This pattern parallels the hiring trends 
experienced by schools four to six years ago with increased 
state funding and the restructuring of schools to accommodate 
a longer school day (from six hours to six and one-half hours 
per day). There are significantly increased staffing numbers 
at the high end of the schedule in years 13 through 28. 
Likewise, the large number of teachers in the 13 to 28 years 
p r e c e d e d  t h e  n u m e r o u s  t a x  i n i t i a t i v e s  o f  t h e  l a t e  1 9 7 0 s  ( e . g . .  
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California's Proposition 13) and represents the current 
"graying" of America's teaching corps. The average years of 
experience for Westonlee School District teachers is 11.8 
years as compared to the national average of 14.5 years of 
experience (Feistritzer, 1990). 
Westonlee School District has a total operating budget of 
$39,749,495. Teacher salaries comprise 40 percent of the 
budget, or $15,934,707, excluding benefits. This is somewhat 
consistent with most of the nation's school districts in that 
roughly half of the average public school district's budget is 
allocated for teachers' salaries (Chubb & Moe, 1990). 
Westonlee School District's average teacher salary for 1989-
1990 was $35,040 as compared to the national average of 
$31,278 and California's average of $35,285. Likewise, this 
can be compared to national regions: Far West, $35,310; 
Middle Atlantic states, $34,689; New England, $34,698; Great 
Lakes region, $33,425; Plains states, $27,874; Rocky Mountain 
states, $27,542; Southeast, $26,883; and Southwest, $26,335 
(Cetron & Gayle, 1991). Sixty-six percent of Westonlee School 
District's teachers earn $35,000 or more as compared to the 
national average of 22 percent of teachers earning more than 
$35,000. The 1987 national average base salary was $26,230; 
Westonlee School District's 1987 base salary of $22,354 was 
$3,875 less, and the 1990 base salary of $25,994 is below by 
$236. No teachers in this district earn more than $50,000, as 
compared to 2 percent nationally (Feistritzer, 1990). 
Table 12. Westonlee School District Salary Schedule for 1990-
91, and Full-Time Employee (PTE) frequency 
distribution by level and years of experience 
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YEAR BA FTE BA+15 FTE BA+30 FTE BA+45 FTE BA+60 FTE FTE Subtotals 
1 25,994 2.5 25,994 2 25,994 1.5 26.817 0 28,369 0 6 
MA N/A 0 N/A 0 26,774 0 27,597 5 29,149 3.5 4 
2 25,994 3 25,994 0 26,593 6 28,144 0 29,695 2 11 
MA N/A 0 N/A 0 27.373 0 28.924 0 30,475 3 3 
3 25,994 2 26.371 4 27.923 6 29.475 3.5 31.022 4 20 
MA N/A 0 N/A 0 28,703 1 30,255 0 31,802 5 6 50 
4 26,149 1.5 27,700 4 29,251 5.5 30,802 3.5 32,352 3 18 
MA N/A 0 N/A 0 30,031 1.5 31.582 0 33.132 4 6 
5 27.475 1 29,033 3 30,584 5 32,131 5.5 33.688 7 22 
MA N/A 0 N/A 0 31,364 1 32.911 2.5 34.468 6.5 10 
6 28,807 0 30,358 0 31,912 2.5 33,461 3 35,012 6 12 
MA N/A 0 N/A 0 32,692 2 34,241 3 35,792 7.5 13 81 
7 30.138 1 31,690 2 33.241 2 34,791 4 36,345 5 14 
MA N/A 0 N/A 0 34.021 .5 35,571 0 37,125 9.5 10 
8 33,018 0 34.568 6 36,121 5.5 37,671 5 17 
MA N/A 0 35.348 1 36.901 0 38.451 7 8 
9 34.348 0 35.898 1 37.449 4 39,001 2 7 
MA N/A 0 36,678 0 38,229 3 39,781 5 8 64 
10 37,229 1 38,779 1 40,331 5 7 
MA 38.009 3 39.559 1 41.111 12 16 
11 38.557 3 40,109 3.5 41,659 6.5 13 
MA 39.337 4 40,889 1 42,439 5 10 
12 41,439 11.5 42,988 5 17 
MA 42.219 1.5 43.768 2 4 
13 44.318 35.5 36 
MA 45,098 13.5 14 
18L 45,618 28.5 29 
18ML 46,398 35.5 36 
23L 46,318 11 11 
23ML 47.098 23 23 
28L 47,018 6 6 
28ML 47.798 21.5 22 237 
TOTAL DISTRICT FTEs 432 
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Although the salary schedule and frequency distribution 
illustrate a hypothetical school district, the figures 
presented can be easily extrapolated to represent staffing and 
budget allocations for any size school district. 
Compensation Range Calculation 
The following Tables 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17 provide an 
example for illustrating the cost computation of the pay for 
performance plan based on (1) the percent of teachers 
qualifying for merit pay and (2) four predetermined salary 
range percents. Table 13 represent 20 percent of teachers 
qualifying; Table 14, 40 percent; Table 15, 60 percent; Table 
16, 80 percent; and Table 17, 100 percent. The percents for 
the salary range minimum and maximums, respectively, are; 1 
percent and 3 percent; 3 percent and 5 percent; 5 percent and 
7 percent; and 7 percent and 10 percent. These tables serve 
two purposes: (1) to illustrate the compensation ranges for 
each of the four salary range percents and for each of the 
"Years of Experience" range; and (2) to determine the total 
district cost. 
As demonstrated in Table 13, to determine the 
Compensation Range (lines 11 and 12) the average salary (line 
4) within the "Years of Experience" range is computed, then 
multiplied by the minimum and maximum salary range percents 
(lines 8 and 9, respectively). The Salary Range Minimum and 
Maximum for one to three "Years of Experience" are $25,994 and 
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$31,802, respectively (these values were originally 
ascertained from Table 12, the Westonlee School District 
Salary Schedule, and represent the minimum salary—one year 
and Bachelors Degree, and maximum—three years. Bachelors 
Degree, 60 additional semester units, and Master's Degree). 
The average of those salaries is $28,898. Multiplying this 
average by the minimum and maximum salary range percents of 1 
and 3 percent produces the Compensation Range Minimum of $289 
and the Compensation Range Maximum of $867. 
To determine the Total Compensation Minimum and Maximum 
per "Years of Experience", the Compensation Range Minimum and 
Maximum are multiplied by the number of teachers qualifying 
for compensation. Thus, the resultant minimum and maximum 
compensation for the one to three "Years of Experience" with 
20 percent of 50 teachers qualifying (or 10 teachers) are 
$2,890 and $8,670, respectively. 
Finally, to determine the overall possible compensation 
the district may need to award, the totals of each "Years of 
Experience" category are added together. Thus, for 20 percent 
of teachers qualifying for performance pay at the one to three 
percent salary range, the total possible compensation the 
district will have to encumber is between the minimum of 
$32,375 and the maximum of $97,096. 
Following the same procedures. Tables 14 through 17 
illustrate the aforementioned percents of teachers qualifying 
and calculated against 1 and 3 percent, 3 and 5 percent, 
Table 13. Compensation range calculations for 20 percent of 
the district's teachers qualifying for merit pay 
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Years of Experience 1-3 4-6 7-9 10 or mnre Totals 
Salary Range Minimum 25,994 26,149 30,138 37,229 
Salary Range Maximum 31,802 35.792 39,781 47.798 
Average Salary 28,898 30.971 34,960 . 42,514 
# of District Teachers 50 81 64 237 432 
X of Teachers Qualifying 20 20 20 20 20 
# of Teachers Qualifying 10 16 13 47 86 
IX and 3X Salary Range 
X of Salary Minimum 1 1 1 1 
X of Salary Maximum 3 3 3 3 
Compensation Range Minimum 289 310 350 425 
Comipensation Range Maximum 867 929 1,049 1,275 
Total Compensation Minimum 2,890 4,960 4.550 19,975 32,375 
Total Compensation Maximum 8,670 14,864 13,637 59,925 97,096 
3X and 5X Salary Range 
X of Salary Minimum 3 3 3 3 
X of Salary Maximum 5 5 5 5 
Compensation Range Minimum 867 929 1,049 1,275 
Compensation Range Maximum 1,445 1,549 1,748 2,126 
Total Compensation Minimum 8,670 14,864 13,637 59,925 97,096 
Total Compensation Maximum 14,450 24,784 22,724 99,922 161,880 
5X and 7X Salary R ange 
X of Salary Minimum 5 5 5 5 
X of Salary Maximum 7 7 7 7 
Compensation Range Minimum 1,445 1,549 1,748 2,126 
Compensation Range Maximum 2,023 2,168 2,447 2,976 
Total Compensation Minimum 14,450 24.784 22,724 99,922 161,880 
Total Compensation Maximum 20,230 34,688 31,811 139,872 226,601 
7X and 10X Salary Range 
X of Salary Minimum 7 7 7 7 
X of Salary Maximum 10 10 10 10 
Compensation Range Minimum 2,023 2,168 2,447 2,976 
Compensation Range Maximum 2,890 3.097 3,496 4.251 
Total Compensation Minimum 20,230 34,688 31,811 139,872 226,601 
Total Compensation Maximum 28,900 49,552 45,448 199,797 323,697 
Table 14. Compensation range calculations for 40 percent of 
the district's teachers qualifying for merit pay 
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Years of Experience 1-3 4-6 7-9 10 or more Totals 
Salary Range Hininun 25.994 26,149 30.138 37.229 
Salary Range Maxinun 31.802 35,792 39,781 47,798 
Average Salary 28,898 30,971 34,960 42,514 
# of District Teachers 50 81 64 237 432 
X of Teachers Qualifying 40 40 40 40 40 
# of Teachers Qualifying 20 32 26 95 173 
IX and 3X Salary Range 
X of Salary Hininun 1 1 1 1 
X of Salary Maximum 3 3 3 3 
Compensation Range Minimum 289 310 350 425 
Compensation Range Maximum 867 929 1,049 1,275 
Total Compensation Minimum 5.780 9.920 9,100 40.375 65.175 
Total Compensation Maximum 17,340 29,728 27,274 121,125 195,467 
3X and 5% Salary Range 
X of Salary Minimum 3 3 3 3 
X of Salary Maximum 5 5 5 5 
Compensation Range Minimum 867 929 1,049 1,275 
Compensation Range Maximum 1,445 1.549 1,748 2,126 
Total Compensation Minimum 17,340 29,728 27,274 121,125 195,467 
Total Compensation Maximum 28,900 49,568 45,448 201,970 325,886 
5X and 7% Salary Range 
X of Salary Minimum 5 5 5 5 
X of Salary Maximum 7 7 7 7 
Compensation Range Minimum 1.445 1.549 1,748 2,126 
Compensation Range Maximum 2.023 2,168 2,447 2,976 
Total Compensation Minimun 28,900 49,568 45.448 201,970 325,886 
Total Compensation Maximum 40,460 69,376 63,622 282,720 456,178 
7X and 10X Salary (ange 
X of Salary Hininun 7 7 7 7 
X of Salary Maxinun 10 10 10 10 
Compensation Range Minimum 2,023 2,168 2,447 2,976 
Compensation Range Maximum 2.890 3.097 3,496 4,251 
Total Compensation Minimum 40,460 69.376 63,622 282,720 456,178 
Total Compensation Maximun 57,800 99,104 90,896 403,845 651,645 
Table 15. Compensation range calculations for 60 percent of 
the district's teachers qualifying for merit pay 
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Years of Experience 1-3 4-6 7-9 10 or more Totals 
Salary Range Mininun 25.994 26,149 30.138 37,229 
Salary Range Maximum 31.802 35.792 39,781 47,798 
Average Salary 28,898 30.971 34,960 42,514 
# of District Teachers 50 81 64 237 432 
X of Teachers Qualifying 60 60 60 60 60 
# of Teachers Qualifying 30 49 38 142 259 
IX and 3X Salary Range 
X of Salary Minimum 1 1 1 1 
X of Salary Maximum 3 3 3 3 
Compensation Range Minimum 289 310 350 425 
Compensation Range Maximum 867 929 1,049 1,275 
Total Compensation Minimum 8.670 15,190 13,300 60,350 97,510 
Total Compensation Maximum 26,010 45,521 39,862 181,050 292,443 
3X and 5X Salary Range 
X of Salary Hinimun 3 3 3 3 
X of Salary Maximum 5 5 5 5 
Compensation Range Minimum 867 929 1.049 1,275 
Compensation Range Maximum 1,445 1.549 1.748 2,126 
Total Compensation Minimum 26,010 45,521 39,862 181,050 292,443 
Total Compensation Maximum 43,350 75,901 66,424 301,892 487,567 
5X and 7X Salary R ange 
X of Salary Minimun 5 5 5 5 
X of Salary Maximun 7 7 7 7 
Compensation Range Minimun 1.445 1.549 1.748 2,126 
Compensation Range Maximum 2.023 2,168 2.447 2,976 
Total Compensation Minimum 43.350 75.901 66.424 301,892 487,567 
Total Compensation Maximum 60.690 106,232 92,986 422,592 682,500 
7X and 10X Salary Range 
X of Salary Minimum 7 7 7 7 
X of Salary Maximum 10 10 10 10 
Compensation Range Minimum 2,023 2,168 2,447 2,976 
Compensation Range Maximum 2,890 3,097 3.496 4,251 
Total Compensation Minimun 60,690 106,232 92,986 422,592 682,500 
Total Compensation Haximun 86,700 151,753 132,848 603,642 974,943 
Table 16. Compensation range calculations for 80 percent of 
the district's teachers qualifying for merit pay 
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Years of Experience 1-3 4>6 7-9 10 or more Totals 
Salary Range Minimum 25,994 26.149 30,138 37.229 
Salary Range Maximun 31.802 35.792 39,781 47,798 
Average Salary 28,898 30.971 34,960 42,514 
# of District Teachers 50 81 64 237 432 
X of Teachers Qualifying 80 80 80 80 80 
# of Teachers Qualifying 40 65 51 190 346 
IX and 3X Salary Range 
X of Salary Minimum 1 1 1 1 
X of Salary Maximum 3 3 3 3 
Compensation Range Minimum 289 310 350 425 
Compensation Range Maximun 867 929 1,049 1,275 
Total Compensation Minimum 11,560 20.150 17.850 80.750 130,310 
Total Compensation Maximun 34,680 60,385 53,499 242,250 390,814 
3X and 5X Salary Range 
X of Salary Minimum 3 3 3 3 
X of Salary Maximum 5 5 5 5 
Compensation Range Minimun 867 929 1,049 1,275 
Compensation Range Maximun 1,445 1,549 1,748 2,126 
Total Compensation Minimun 34,680 60,385 53,499 242,250 390,814 
Total Compensation Maximun 57,800 100,685 89,148 403,940 651,573 
5X and 7X Salary Range 
X of Salary Minimun 5 5 5 5 
X of Salary Maximum 7 7 7 7 
Compensation Range Minimun 1,445 1.549 1,748 2.126 
Compensation Range Maximun 2,023 2.168 2,447 2.976 
Total Compensation Minimun 57,800 100.685 89,148 403,940 651,573 
Total Compensation Maximum 80,920 140,920 124,797 565,440 912,077 
7X and 10X Salary Range 
X of Salary Minimum 7 7 7 7 
X of Salary Maximum 10 10 10 10 
Compensation Range Minimun 2,023 2,168 2,447 2,976 
Compensation Range Maximum 2.890 3.097 3.496 4.251 
Total Compensation Minimum 80,920 140.920 124,797 565,440 912,077 
Total Compensation Maximun 115,600 201,305 178,296 807,690 1,302,891 
Table 17. Compensation range calculations for 100 percent of 
the district's teachers qualifying for merit pay 
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Years of Experience 1-3 4-6 7-9 10 or more Totals 
Salary Range Minimum 25,994 26,149 30,138 37,229 
Salary Range Maximum 31,802 35,792 39,781 47,798 
Average Salary 28,898 30,971 34,960 42,514 
# of District Teachers 50 81 64 237 432 
X of Teachers Qualifying 100 100 100 100 100 
# of Teachers Qualifying 50 81 64 237 432 
IX and 3X Salary Range 
X of Salary Minimun 1 1 1 1 
X of Salary Maximun 3 3 3 3 
Compensation Range Minimum 289 310 350 425 
Compensation Range Maximun 867 929 1,049 1,275 
Total Compensation Minimum 14.450 25.110 22,400 100.725 162.685 
Total Compensation Maximum 43,350 75,249 67,136 302,175 487,910 
3X and SX Salary Range 
X of Salary Minimum 3 3 3 3 
X of Salary Maximun 5 5 5 5 
Compensation Range Minimum 867 929 1,049 1,275 
Compensation Range Maximun 1,445 1,549 1.748 2,126 
Total Compensation Minimum 43,350 75,249 67,136 302,175 487,910 
Total Compensation Maximum 72,250 125,469 111,872 503,862 813,453 
5X and 7X Salary Range 
X of Salary Minimum 5 5 5 5 
X of Salary Maximun 7 7 7 7 
Compensation Range Minimum 1.445 1.549 1.748 2,126 
Compensation Range Maximun 2.023 2,168 2.447 2,976 
Total Compensation Minimum 72,250 125,469 111.872 503,862 813,453 
Total Compensation Maximum 101,150 175,608 156,608 705,312 1,138,678 
7X and 10X Salary Range 
X of Salary Minimum 7 7 7 7 
X of Salary Maximun 10 10 10 10 
Compensation Range Minimun 2,023 2,168 2,447 2,976 
Compensation Range Maximum 2,890 3.097 3.496 4.251 
Total Compensation Minimun 101,150 175,608 156,608 705,312 1,138,678 
Total Compensation Maximum 144,500 250,857 223,744 1,007,487 1,626,588 
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5 and 7 percent, and 7 and 10 percent of the average salary. 
These percents serve only to illustrate a computed dollar 
amount. However, the district must structure the compensation 
to be (1) a lucrative increase in salary; (2) perceived by 
teachers as worthwhile to pursue; and (3) sustainable as an 
on-going budget expenditure. A lucrative salary increase in 
the context of performance compensation is dependent upon its 
motivational strength. As cited previously in this study, 
current incentive pay plans compensate teachers from $1,000 to 
$4,000. 
Summary Table 18 concisely illustrates the ranges of 
compensation costs (derived from Tables 13, 14, 15, 16, and 
17) the district could incur considering two variables: (1) 
the percent of teachers within thé district qualifying for 
performance pay compensation, and (2) the percent of the 
average salary per "Years of Experience." Additionally, the 
summary table provides the percent of the total district 
budget of $39,749,495 that each level of compensation 
represents. As an example, if 40 percent of the district's 
teachers qualify, or 173 teachers, using the 3 and 5 percent 
salary range, the total minimum the district would award is 
$195,467 or .48 percent of the total budget, and the total 
maximum would be $325,886 or .80 percent of the total budget. 
Thus, a merit pay plan using these results would cost the 
district between one-half and one percent of their total 
operating budget. If all the teachers qualified and using the 
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maximum 10 percent compensation range, the maximum percent of 
the total operating budget that could be incurred is 4.09 
percent. 
Table 18. Summary table of the Compensation Ranges and the 
percent of the total district budget ($39,749,495) 
each represents, using differing percents of 
qualifying teachers 
X of Teachers Qualifying 20 percent 40 percent 60 percent 80 percent 100 percent 
# of Teachers Qualifying 86 173 259 346 432 
1 percent- Minimum 32,375 65.175 97,510 130.310 162,685 
Percent of total budget .08 .16 .24 .33 .41 
3 percent Maximum 97.096 195.467 292.443 390,814 487.910 
Percent of total budget .24 .48 .74 .98 1.23 
3 percent- Mi ni mm 97,096 195,467 292.443 390.814 487,910 
Percent of total budget .24 .48 .74 .98 1.23 
5 percent- Maximum 161,880 325.886 487.567 651.575 813,453 
Percent of total budget .40 .80 1.23 1.64 2.05 
5 percent- Minimum 161,880 325,886 487.567 651.573 813,453 
Percent of total budget .40 .80 1.23 1.64 2.05 
7 percent- Maximum 226,601 456.178 682.500 912,077 1,138,678 
Percent of total budget .57 1.14 1.72 2.29 2.86 
7 percent- Minimum 226,601 456.178 682.500 912.077 1,138,678 
Percent of total budget .57 1.14 1.72 2.29 2.86 
10 percent- Maximum 323,697 651,645 974,943 1,302,891 1,626,588 
Percent of total budget .81 1.63 2.45 3.28 4.09 
Calculating Individual Teacher's Compensation 
It is necessary to determine the exact amount of 
compensation for each qualifying teacher. The Compensation 
Ranges are differentiated for each "Years of Experience" 
range, and within each Compensation Range. Since the range 
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for Teachers* Composite Scores is reduced across the Continued 
Professional Growth Schedule (Table 6), and the Compensation 
Ranges increase per the salary schedule, the net result 
provides for substantially greater compensation per score. 
Figure 14 contains the formula for the Compensation 
Constant. The Compensation Constant is the dollar amount 
which will be awarded for each point of the Teacher's 
Composite Score above the minimum score of that range and 
added to the Compensation Range minimum. The Compensation 
Constant is computed by determining the difference between 
Compensation Range Maximum and Minimum dollar value and 
dividing by the range of the Teachers' Composite Scores for 
the particular "Years of Experience" range. Thus, in Figure 
14, the difference, $699, of the Compensation Range Maximum 
and Minimum ($1,748 - $1,049) divided by the Range of 
Formula: 
Compensation Range / Range of Teacher's 
Max - Min / Composite Score 
Max - Min 
Example Data: 
Compensation Range = $1,049 to $1,748 
Teacher's Composite Score Range = 80 to 100 
Calculation Example: 
($1,748 - $1,049) / (100 - 80) = $699 / 20 = $34.95 
Figure 14. Formula and example computation of the 
Compensation Constant assigned for each point of 
the Teacher's Composite Score above the minimum 
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Teacher's Composite Score Maximum and Minimum of 20 (100 -
80), each percentage point above 80 percent of the Teacher's 
Composite Score is worth $34.95. 
With the computed Compensation Constant for each point, 
the compensation for a specific Teacher's Composite Score can 
be computed. As illustrated in Figure 15, the teacher's 
individual compensation is calculated by multiplying the 
Compensation Constant of $34.95 by the difference between the 
Teacher's Composite Score and the lowest score of the 
Teacher's Composite Score Range (7), and adding the product of 
$244.65 to the lowest compensation value of $1,049. Thus, a 
teacher scoring 87 on the Teacher's Composite Score would 
receive $1,293.65 of Pay for Performance compensation. 
Formula; 
[(D)(Teacher's Composite - Lowest Score of)] + Lowest 
Score Teacher Composite Compensation 
Range Value 
Example Data; 
Teacher's Composite Score = 87 
Calculation Example: 
[($34.95)(87 - 80)] + $1,049 = [($34.95) (7)] + $1,049 = 
$244.65 + $1,049 = $1,293.65 
Figure 15. Formula and example computation for determining 
the compensation to be awarded per Teacher's 
Composite Score 
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Program Funding 
Using the aforementioned results and comparison 
demographics, a school district could extrapolate the cost of 
a performance-based pay plan. As a point of departure, the 
summary results illustrate the cost for this model independent 
of the funding source. The actual funding source of the plan 
may vary; numerous state legislatures have mandated 
and are funding such programs (Cornett, 1990). The state-
supported South Carolina Teacher Incentive Plan has provided 
over $21.5 million for its program; under the individual 
component, teachers are awarded between $2,000 and $3,000 
annually (Cornett, 1988). In Utah $41 million was available 
for local school districts to reward performance-based 
evaluation systems; considering the varied programs Utah 
offers, the individual merit awards average $1,688 or roughly 
7 percent of the base average salary. The Arizona pilot 
program is state funded at a $14.5 million level for up to 15 
districts; as an example, in 1988-89 the Amphitheater School 
District awarded extra compensation to 40 percent of its 
teachers at a cost of $1.6 million (Amsler et al., 1988). 
Other states committed major funding for incentive programs 
during the 1988-89 school year: Texas, $104 million; 
Tennessee, $99 million; California, $63 million; North 
Carolina, $46 million; Iowa, $42 million; New York, $25 
million; Florida and Missouri, $10 to $13 million (Cornett, 
1988, 1989). 
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Frase and Boston (1990) found that massive external 
(state) funding was not necessary for success. Some 
characteristics that negatively affect incentive plans that 
are externally funded include (1) many programs limit the 
number of teachers who can qualify, thus losing teacher 
support; and (2) districts find themselves restricted by the 
bureaucracy. They recommend that state legislatures 
considering incentive pay programs should (1) shift the locus 
of control to the district; (2) limit requirements to annual 
progress reports or formal descriptions of the plan and its 
implementation; (3) support and assist with implementation but 
do not administer the program; and (4) invest in the risk of 
funding local districts. 
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CHAPTER V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, 
DISCUSSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Summary-Overview of the Study 
This study reviewed the current incentive pay literature 
and determined a need, potential format, variables, and 
procedures for the development and implementation of a 
comprehensive pay for performance plan for teachers. This 
study provided a model, based on the total systems approach to 
teacher evaluation, from which school districts could develop 
a plan. Finally, this study examined the cost feasibility of 
the model in terms of teacher compensation. 
The review of literature served to substantiate the 
theoretical, social, and professional basis for the 
development of a teacher performance-based compensation plan. 
The literature provided three overwhelming reasons for the use 
of teacher performance-based pay plans: (1) to increase 
recruitment and holding power of the teacher work force; (2) 
to improve the professionalization of teaching; and (3) to 
provide a sound evaluation system and supporting procedures. 
These reasons were supported by current effective schools 
research, the public's request for school accountability, and 
the emphasis on school restructuring. 
The development of the model reflected current effective 
schools research, sound pedagogy, rational motivation theory, 
a total systems approach to teacher evaluation, and 
longstanding business management practices. The study 
provided the model which included the overall paradigm and the 
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individual component algorithms. Additionally, the model 
illustrated the practical implementation of the plan; the 
examples demonstrated the mathematical computations of the 
algorithms. The model also included the rationale for each 
variable in the form of the Teacher Performance Evaluation 
System and the supporting procedures for implementation. 
The study applied the performance-based plan using a 
hypothetical school district's staffing demographics and 
salary schedule. This demonstration provided an example of 
the cost feasibility to implement the model plan in terms of 
the dollar amount incurred by the district for teacher 
performance compensation. The information was presented in a 
matrix format to demonstrate varying degrees of qualifying 
teachers and percent of salary. Additionally, the study 
provided varidus examples of possible Teacher Composite Scores 
that would qualify for compensation. 
Conclusions of the Study 
The major result of this study is the turn-key prototype 
of the pay for performance plan and its cost feasibility. 
Second, the synthesis of the literature substantiates the need 
for and implementation of such a model. Third, understanding 
the theoretical and hypothetical nature of this study, and 
considering the limitations binding a non-statistical study, 
this research attempted to answer the following questions 
posed. 
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First research question 
Does the influence of the current political climate, pro­
fessional ization of teaching, and/or the apparent teacher 
shortage warrant the implementation of performance-based pay 
plans? 
The overwhelming evidence suggests that incentive pay 
programs are one the agendas at all levels of school 
governance from the President to the state legislatures 
through the local boards of education. Surveys indicate the 
profession of teaching is in desperate need of improving its 
status within our society; the public continues to hold 
educators accountable for results. Likewise, the quality and 
amount of teachers required to meet staffing demands will need 
to improve and increase; incentive pay plans and the resulting 
financial awards are viewed as strategies that may well 
attract and retain highly qualified teacher candidates. 
Second research cmestion 
What variables should be included in a comprehensive pay 
for performance plan? 
Since this model used the individual teacher as the unit 
of evaluation and reward, it is concluded that the 
supervisor's rating, student achievement, and student feedback 
are variables required in the model. All variables can be 
accurately measured using the model's requirements of well-
trained evaluators, a sound evaluation cycle, processes and 
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instruments, criterion-referenced tests, and the Student 
Feedback to Teachers Questionnaire. The model is constructed 
with differing weights for each variable which reflects the 
varying influence of each variable on the overall model. 
Third research question 
Can a comprehensive merit pay plan model be developed 
that represents current effective schools research, motivation 
theory, and sound pedagogy? 
The paradigm is the result of the application of 
effective schools research, motivation theory, and sound 
pedagogy to the incentive pay issue. As each of the variables 
was examined for inclusion in the model, elements within 
effective schools research, motivation theory, and 
instructional methodologies were found to substantiate their 
use in the paradigm. Additionally, the SIM Teacher 
Performance Evaluation system is the by-product of current 
effective schools research and accepted pedagogy. The 
criteria and standards which the model utilizes directly 
reflect sound teaching and learning methods. Incentive pay in 
industry has been proven to be a strong motivator and an 
accepted business strategy for improving the quality of 
performance. 
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Fourth research question 
How should the factors selected for inclusion in a merit 
pay plan model be weighted? 
Because this study only provides for the development of 
the model and not its statistical analysis, the weight of each 
variable within the paradigm has been established 
hypothetically. However, the weight of each variable 
represents (1) the intended influence of that variable to the 
overall results of the model's algorithms and (2) the 
importance of each variable based on the teaching/learning 
experience reflecting the district's Philosophy of Evaluation. 
The weight of each variable in terms of points of the total 
score a teacher can earn is: Supervisor's Rating, 50 points; 
Student Achievement, 33 points; and Student Feedback, 17 
points. The algorithms are structured so the points of the 
Supervisor's Rating (50) is equal to the total of both Student 
Achievement (33) and Student Feedback (17) points combined; 
thus, the Supervisor's Rating is as influential to the overall 
results as the other two variables combined. Likewise, 
Student Achievement (33) is twice as powerful as the Student 
Feedback (17) variable based on the ratio of possible points 
assigned to each (the numerical values were rounded off for 
ease of application). 
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Fifth research question 
How should the pay for performance plan algorithms be 
developed to provide for a balanced, yet properly distributed, 
comprehensive model? 
Combined with the differing weights of each variable, the 
individual variable algorithms should be constructed to 
discriminate between teacher performances and compensation. 
The three variables should be independently assessed then 
combined to produce the teacher's overall score. Likewise, 
the distribution of the performance compensation should be 
differentiated reflecting the teacher's performance. 
The Supervisor's Rating algorithm should bè based solely 
on the numerical values assigned to the eighteen criteria, and 
their definitive descriptors, and teacher and student 
indicators as established on the district's Teacher 
Performance Indicator Bridge. The eighteen criteria should 
also be assigned values as represented by "meets", "exceeds", 
and "does not meet criterion" standards. And the criteria 
should be ranked in order of importance to the 
teaching/learning experience by the district's Stakeholders' 
Committee. To reflect the differing importance of each 
criterion, the ranking should be further clustered into three 
groups and assigned differing weights per cluster; in this 
study they represented the top 80 percent, 70 percent, and 60 
percent rank order. Thus, the Supervisor's Rating should 
provide differing weights and three performance standards to 
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accurately assess the teacher's performance during the 
observation. 
The Student Achievement variable should be based on the 
percent of an individual teacher's students successfully 
meeting the Student Mastery Level on the criterion-referenced 
mastery test. The Student Achievement algorithm should not 
differentiate levels of student achievement, rather it should 
be constructed to eliminate student scores that, for one of 
the articulated reasons, would not reliably represent the 
teacher's instructional abilities. Additionally, class size 
should be considered as an add-on value to the Student 
Achievement variable. The class size algorithm should 
differentiate between the levels/types of students in each 
class; students should be confidentially weighted according to 
their academic abilities. However slight the class size value 
may influence the Student Achievement Score, it serves to 
acknowledge the teachers' beliefs that class size can affect 
the classroom setting. 
The Student Feedback variable should be compared against 
the mean score of all the teachers in the district. The 
teacher's Student Feedback Score is weighted equally; each 
point scored by a teacher receives the same value which is a 
computed constant number based on each year's district mean 
score. 
Finally, the Compensation Ranges should also be 
differentiated. The use of differentiated compensation 
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considers the teacher's years of experience and differing 
score ranges. As the teacher's years of experience increase, 
the plan should become more conservative in the scores 
qualifying for compensation. Likewise, as the years of 
experience increase and the score ranges decrease, the amount 
of compensation should increase per teacher's score. Thus it 
should be more difficult to qualify, but more rewarding. 
The process by which the algorithms were developed for 
this model provides a more accurate and discriminating basis 
against which to evaluate teacher performance. The use of 
three separate yet weighted assessments of teacher performance 
provides a system that applies varying importance between the 
variables. The Teacher's Composite Scores matrix (Table 8), 
using combinations of minimum, average, and maximum scores on 
the three variables, hypothetically illustrates that 44 
percent of the teacher's scores would qualify. 
Sixth research question 
What legal, motivational, and/or procedural 
considerations should be included in a merit pay plan model? 
The merit pay plan should include in the system's 
processes a number of assurances for teachers as well as the 
school district. Initially, the plan should be 
collaboratively developed by a Stakeholders' Committee 
consisting of teachers, administrators, school board members, 
and the community. To ensure continual teacher input and 
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review, a Pay for Performance Review Team should be 
established. This advisory team should consist of 
representation from all levels of certificated personnel. 
The Pay for Performance Review Team should administer the 
appeals process. The appeals process should reflect sound due 
process procedures, be timely in its application, and not be 
punitive in nature. 
Participation in the merit pay plan should be mandatory. 
The application process should be a part of the formal, yearly 
evaluation process; it will take the form of the Professional 
Actiyitiess Report and professional goals established by the 
teacher and administrator. 
Motivational rationale should be a part of the 
theoretical basis of the plan as it is developed. Some 
considerations should include: the amount of compensation 
awarded; professional development opportunities as part of the 
Continuing Professional Growth Schedule activities; and the 
teacher's personal reward and continued challenge of 
quantifying her/his students' academic success. Compensation 
should not supplement the salary schedule, rather, it should 
complement the teacher's salary. Professional Growth 
Activities should support improvement and stimulate growth for 
the teacher. 
The Performance-based Pay Plan should be easy to 
administrate and timely. The plan should not be labor 
intensive; instruments should be clear, concise, and easily 
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collated and computed. Teacher involvement in data collection 
should be limited to Professional Growth Activities Reports, 
administering the Student Mastery Test and the Student 
Feedback to Teacher Questionnaire. Computation and scoring 
should be the responsibility of the district. 
Seventh research question 
What is the possible cost of compensation the district 
may incur using different percents of salary and varying the 
number of teachers qualifying? 
The examples presented in Chapter IV illustrate the 
possible levels of current funding for both programs and 
individuals. It is evident the salary range examples for 
individuals using 3 percent, 5 percent, 7 percent, and 10 
percent of the average salary fall within the funding levels 
of established performance-based pay programs. These 
compensation ranges are: 3 percent, $867 to $1,275; 5 
percent, $1,445 to $2,126; 7 percent, $2,023 to $2,976; and 10 
percent, $2,890 to $4,251. 
The maximum cost to the district if all teachers 
qualified for merit pay, considering each salary range 
percent, would be; 3 percent, $487,910; 5 percent, $813,453; 
7 percent, $1,138,678; and 10 percent, $1,1626,588. Based on 
the hypothetical budget of $39,749,495, the percent of the 
total budget for merit pay based on the same percent of salary 
considering all teachers qualified would be: 3 percent, 1.28 
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percent; 5 percent, 2.04 percent; 7 percent, 2.86 percent; and 
10 percent, 4.09 percent. 
Limitations of the Study 
A number of limitations resulted from the nature and 
design of this study. The limitations are enumerated as 
follows: 
1. This study was hypothetical in nature. Its intent 
was solely to develop the pay for performance plan model and 
to examine the cost feasibility of it. Thus, this study was 
not a "real world" application of the model; rather, it was a 
theoretical paper and pencil exercise to determine if such a 
plan is financially viable, or cost prohibitive, and what the 
dollar value of such a plan would be considering a 
hypothetical district budget. 
2. This study was limited to only one school district's 
salary schedule and staffing demographics in its cost 
feasibility analysis and matrices development. Thus, this 
plan's cost feasibility represents only this school district's 
financial and staffing profiles. Although this district may 
well represent other similar school districts, it is likewise 
limited to the geographic, political, and economic region it 
represents. However, considering this limitation, it is 
possible to use the examples and model and extrapolate data 
based on another district's parameters. 
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3. This study represents the current state of budgetary 
practices and levels of funding. With a fluctuating economy, 
educational institutions could profit or suffer from the state 
of financing. Thus in education, as in business and industry, 
a pay for performance system can be directly and severely 
affected by the financial climate. This study provides a 
model reflecting an assumed stable economic base. 
4. This study limited its examples of Compensation 
Ranges to a few benchmark percents of the average salary (1 
percent, 3 percent, 5 percent, 7 percent, and 10 percent). As 
with the salary schedule and demographics, these percents 
serve only as examples, and could be adjusted to meet the 
financial and philosophical position of the specific district. 
5. This study provides a performance-based pay plan 
based on one model of a Teacher Performance Evaluation system. 
Its criteria against which teachers are evaluated within the 
teaching episode are limited to those criteria selected by the 
district's Stakeholders' Committee. The criteria selected are 
found in current research demonstrating sound teaching 
practices; however the Stakeholders' Committee limited the 
process to eighteen. Additionally, the evaluation cycle and 
supporting procedures illustrate only one teacher evaluation 
system. 
6. This study did not address the financial cost of 
implementation, administration, or support services required 
to maintain the plan. This study strictly analyzed the cost 
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of the program in terms of teacher compensation. Likewise, it 
did not consider the practical application concerns such as 
(1) the increase in time required for site administrators to 
coordinate and monitor the Continuing Professional Growth 
Schedule activities and maintain observation schedules; (2) 
the time and support staff required to implement, administer, 
and maintain a Criterion-referenced Testing program; (3) the 
time and support staff required to survey students for the 
Student Feedback Report; and (4) the cost of providing staff 
development opportunities required of teachers for 
Professional Growth Schedule activities. 
7. This study did not assess the validity of this model 
merit pay plan on teacher morale, teacher or student 
motivation, resultant student achievement, teacher 
performance, teacher acceptability, or teacher satisfaction. 
8. This study did not statistically validate (1) the 
influences of the individual variables within the model; (2) 
the appropriateness of the weights assigned to each variable 
within the individual algorithms; or (3) weights assigned to 
the classification of students within the class size variable. 
Discussion of the Study 
This study brings together a synthesis of the most 
current literature on incentive pay, effective schools 
practices, and motivation theory with the operational 
algorithms and compensation martices. It is a "turn-key" 
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system for immediate implementation for school districts ready 
to embrace merit pay. It contributes a practical example of a 
multi-variable performance-based pay plan to the existing 
performance pay body of knowledge. And it transforms the 
theories and justifications for incentive pay into a viable 
and usable model. 
The plan development process, by itself, can function as 
an evaluation tool for the current district policies and 
practices. The performance-based pay plan is a model against 
which the district's philosophies of education, evaluation and 
instruction should be rigorously examined and adjusted. The 
school district, community and staff must be ready for 
incentive pay; the readiness of the organization is paramount 
to the decision to implement merit pay. Improved student 
achievement through improved instructional quality is the 
ultimate purpose of this plan. 
This performance based pay plan uniquely includes major 
characteristics from three different types of evaluation 
models found in McGreal's taxonomy (McGreal, 1983). The 
combination of these elements supports teacher strengths 
without necessarily diminishing the expected performance 
standards. This also adds to the model's integrity by 
combining the strengths of various approaches into one model. 
There is no other merit pay plan that accesses the 
variety nor the breadth of data sources as this model does. 
This model uses three factors to assess a teacher's 
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performance: the Supervisor's Rating, Student Achievement and 
Student Feedback. Current education research supports each of 
these three factors as being valid, reliable, and accurate 
variables to assess. Furthermore, current effective schools 
literature indicates each of these factors, when developed and 
implemented properly, can significantly contribute to 
increased student achievement (Manatt & Stow, 1986; Duke & 
Stiggins, 1986; Judkins, 1987). Thus, combining these factors 
into one plan provides a clearer assessment of a teacher's 
performance and increases the probability for improved student 
achievement. 
The implementation of this merit pay system requires the 
school district to commit to a number of significant 
practices. The Supervisor's Rating factor requires the 
district to accurately articulate the specific criteria 
against which to evaluate the performance of teachers. The 
number of performance criteria (18) and the Stakeholder's 
Committee process of developing them are demonstrated in this 
model; these are consistent with the literature's 
recommendations (Crespa, McCormick, & Paget, 1984; Manatt, 
1986; Manatt, 1987). The clustering of the criteria is 
determined by the Stakeholders' Committee and ranked, 
differentiating the emphasis of the teaching behaviors. This 
local ranking of criteria is unique to this plan. This model 
also incorporates a Teacher Performance Indicator Bridge that 
clearly describes expected teacher and student behaviors; this 
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is exclusive to this plan. Additionally, the evaluation cycle 
and conferencing model are also representative of solid 
effective school's practices. 
The Supervisor's Rating is the most subjective factor in 
the model and could be the most criticized by opponents of the 
model. More classroom observations with multiple observers 
could increase the validity of the evaluation results, but the 
demand on observer's time and the associated costs could be 
prohibitive. With sound training and supervised practice 
inter-rater reliability between administrator/evaluators can 
be held constant and meet high standards. Likewise, the clear 
performance criteria, evaluation instrumentation, and peer 
coaching opportunities ensure a consistent and fair assessment 
of the teacher's performance. 
The Student Achievement factor requires the school 
district to articulate a comprehensive assessment system 
dependent on the district's curriculum and instructional 
practices. A criterion-referenced test battery, locally 
normed and validated against the district's curriculum 
standards, is essential for the integrity of this model. 
This assessment factor can be adapted to allow for the 
inclusion of alternative testing methods such as student 
portfolios, performance or authentic assessment, open-ended 
questions, and prompt-driven writing samples. Each of these 
methods would directly assess course outcomes and carefully 
utilize district developed rubrics and/or holistic scoring 
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methods. Using these new methods the results would still be 
locally normed and easily applied to the Student Achievement 
algorithm. 
The Student Feedback factor is used to access the 
students' perceptions of the teacher's classroom 
effectiveness. Critics of student feedback would question 
whether students can identify "good teaching" behaviors. 
Studies indicate that students can accurately assess these 
behaviors through well written and validated feedback 
questionnaires. The questions are targeted at specific 
teacher behaviors outlined in the performance criteria and 
validated by research as effective teaching strategies 
(Manatt, 1986; Manatt & Petrone, 1989). Some concerns 
regarding student response modes may be warranted; current 
research is continuing to improve the instrumentation and its 
validity. 
This performance-based pay plan requires the district to 
offer an articulated staff development program to support its 
teachers with their Professional Activities Report. This 
element provides teachers with continual opportunities for 
professional growth and stimulation while providing the 
district with a cadre of trained professionals available to 
provide the training. The literature contends that a 
supportive staff development program can promote increased 
student achievement through the improved instruction and 
classroom support services. 
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Other aspects of this plan that qualify it as an 
exemplary merit system include its protection of teachers' due 
process rights, class size computations, and the weighing of 
the individual and collective algorithms. The appeals 
process, the clearly defined evaluation system and the variety 
and validity of the Student Achievement and Student Feedback 
factors ensure each teacher their due process protection. The 
inclusion of a class size adjustment factor that considers the 
academic ability level of each student addresses the 
variability of each class; teachers and teacher unions view 
this adjustment as fair and equitable. The sophistication of 
the plan may be intimidating to some teachers and 
adiminstrators. However, the complexity of the algorithms and 
weights respectively assigned, serve to proportionally 
emphasize the factors in the order of importance to the 
teaching job. 
The model, alogrithms, compensation matrices, and 
individual teacher awards can easily be computerized to aid in 
the plan administration. Also, the implementation of a 
Computer Managed Instruction (C.H.I.) system would aid in 
facilitating the criterion-referenced test battery and provide 
for test security and randomization of test items. The C.M.I, 
system could also be easily integrated within the overall 
computerized merit pay plan system. 
This model provides four interdependent elements that can 
signficantly improve student achievement. A clearly defined 
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evaluation system promotes improved instruction; improved 
instruction increases student learning. A solid staff 
development program fosters sound teaching strategies; 
improved teaching strategies increases the probability of 
greater student learning. Recognizing the value of and 
soliciting student feedback provides teachers with valuable 
and timely data. And an articulated curriculum supports an 
accurate and valid criterion-referenced assessment program; a 
sound assessment program ensures that what gets tested gets 
taught. The integration of these elements promotes a balanced 
triangulation of curriculum, instruction and assessment 
supported by the clearly articulated performance criteria. 
The literature substantiates the need for incentive pay 
in education. It provides the evidence that performance-based 
pay is a viable movement supported by educators, legislatures 
and the public. Likewise, the literature references the many 
models and successes established in the private sector and 
encourages the development of plans to reflect the models 
delineated in business and industry. The literature argues 
the positive influences of incentive pay plans on teacher 
recruitment, teacher professionalization and teacher 
evaluation systems. 
This model is consistent with accepted motivation theory 
that maintains money can be a motivator or satisfier for 
employees. The degree to which money serves as a motivator 
and the dollar amount that motivates the greatest are 
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continually debated. It is clearly stated in the motivation 
literature that it is difficult to generalize research 
findings to other employment situations because of the 
complexity and diversity of the variables studied. Thus, 
accepting the assumption that money and staff development 
opportunities do motivate, it is conceded that the absolute 
dollar amount of awards is unknown and needs to be determined 
for each specific organization. However, the example amounts 
presented within the model are consistent with the dollar 
amounts awarded in both state supported and mandated plans and 
independent district programs across the nation. 
For the operational implementation of the plan, this 
study provides a series of cost matrices providing comparable 
cost figures and demonstrating the potential compensation 
ranges for teachers qualifying for merit pay. Compensation is 
differentiated based upon years of experience, the Teacher's 
Composite Score based on the three factors, and the 
hypothetical percent of salary. The matrices provide the 
individual and total cost of compensation projected to be 
incurred by the district. Together the matrices serve as 
examples against which districts can compare their level of 
funding to that of the study's. Additionally, it provides 
matrices demonstrating differing numbers of teachers 
qualifying for compensation. The matrices illustrate the 
possible compensation costs for a number of differing 
scenarios; the levels of compensation parallel those currently 
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observed in the programs cited as exemplary by today's 
research. 
Of obvious concern for any incentive plan are the role 
and receptivity of the teachers' union/organization. The 
implementation of such a plan will meet with considerable 
resistance from the employee organization even with the built-
in protections and majority input. It will be easier for the 
districts in states with mandated incentive pay legislation. 
This study found very limited longitudinal research 
indicating the quality of existing performance-based pay 
plans. This new wave of incentive pay practices has not been 
rigorously assessed because of its recency and the diversity 
of plans, funding sources and formats. There does not exist 
conclusive or causal, long-term, statistically-based research 
examining the effect of performance-based pay on such 
variables as teacher motivation, student achievement or the 
myriad of other factors possibly influenced by incentive pay. 
This study provides the model from which the many hypotheses 
surrounding these issues can be further tested. 
This study adds a more sophisticated and complex 
performance pay plan model to the existing body of knowledge. 
It also serves to stimulate the discussion of the intent and 
value of performance-based pay within the entire educational 
community. 
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Recommendations for Practice 
The majority of considerations for implementation have 
been included in the model and accompanying procedures. These 
have focused on internal processes that lead to the 
development of the system and the policy decisions supporting 
it. However, there are other internal and external processes 
that should be acknowledged prior to practice. 
1. District funding and budgeting practices must be 
considered to assure the plan can be funded and sustained at a 
level that insures its long-term integrity. 
2. A thorough and explicit planning process must precede 
the development and implementation of an incentive plan. 
3. Administrators must be trained in evaluation methods 
consistent with the plan. 
4. Teachers must be trained in the teaching 
methodologies and instructional practices reflected in the 
criteria and standards of the plan. 
5. A criterion-referenced test battery, student feedback 
questionnaires, and the Teacher Performance Evaluation system 
must be implemented prior to, or along with, the merit pay 
plan. 
6. Prior to implementation, the cost analysis using 
specific district data, demographics, and/or hypothetical 
performance results should be simulated. 
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7. Upon implementation, the district should develop a 
comprehensive research project to further analyze student and 
teacher performance and attitudes. 
8. State and local education agencies should pursue 
funding of valid performance-based pay systems that can 
improve student achievement and teacher performance. 
9. The implementation process should include continuous 
evaluation and research of all aspects of the plan. As the 
infrastructure of the district changes and as teaching 
methodologies evolve, the plan should also adjust to reflect 
those changes. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
This study provides a model and procedures from which a 
school district can implement a merit pay system. It also 
serves to challenge the existing state of performance-based 
pay plans to further study the complex issues surrounding 
merit pay. Recommendations for further research include: 
1. Survey teachers' acceptance of the model in the 
context of structure, concepts, performance factors, and 
amount of compensation; 
2. Replicate the hypothetical compensation matrices 
using different school districts considering budgets and 
funding, geographic region, political influences, and 
demographics; 
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3. Hypothetically replicate the model to determine the 
administrative costs associated with implementation and 
maintenance of the plan; 
4. Replicate the model in a "real world" application and 
design research studies to statistically validate: 
a. the influence or contribution of the each variable to 
the Teacher Composite Score; 
b. the manner of weighing each variable within the 
individual algorithms and for the whole plan; and 
c. the weights assigned to the classification of 
students within the class size variable; 
5. Replicate the model in a "real world" application to 
statistically validate the influence of the plan on; 
a. student achievement; 
b. overall teacher performance; 
c. classroom instruction; 
d. teacher motivation; 
e. teacher morale; 
f. teacher acceptability/satisfaction; 
g. amount of compensation that affects results; and 
h. administrator moral and attitude; and 
6. Replicate the model in a "real world" setting to 
determine (1) viability of the processes and procedures 
required for implementation including administrator time and 
(2) the amount and nature of the appeals within the due 
process system. 
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WESTONLEE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
TEACHER PERFORMANCE EVALUATION PROCEDURES 
Formal evaluation provides the opportunity to assess and 
evaluate professional performance. The primary purpose is the 
improvement of instruction. 
Responsibility for the evaluation process lies with the 
person to whom a teacher is assigned. The teacher or 
administrator may request that other trained or qualified 
observers provide input into the evaluation process. 
Initial contract teachers will be on full cycle for each 
of the first three years of employment in the district. 
Continuing contract teachers will be on full cycle once 
every three years. The full of modified cycles may be applied 
if the respective program administrator or staff member 
requests it. At the end of Year One, the Continuing 
Professional Growth Schedule Plan will be monitored and 
accomplished. 
I. The Full Cycle Evaluation Process 
A. Self-evaluation (self-appraisal) will be completed. The 
form to be used will be the summative evaluation report. 
Input (feedback) from students should be used as self-
analysis. Input will be gathered from those with whom 
the teacher works. These data are for self-improvement. 
The self-evaluation may serve as a source of discussion 
and permit the evaluator and evaluatee to exchange 
information. 
B. Orientation Conference 
1. This meeting is held to discuss the criteria and 
procedures in the evaluation system. 
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2. It can be held with individuals, small groups, or the 
entire faculty. 
C. Preobservation Conference 
1. This conference establishes the framework for the 
classroom observation. 
2. Instructional plans will be submitted to be analyzed 
by the evaluator at least one working day prior to 
this conference so the plans can be discussed. 
3. A preobservation data report will be completed and 
submitted at least one working day prior to this 
conference. 
D. Observations-Formal Announced 
1. The observation will be held for the period of time 
defined during the preobservation conference. 
2. Data will be gathered which describe the teaching/ 
learning situation. 
E. Feedback Conference 
1. Following the observations, the evaluator will 
analyze the data. 
2. The conference will be held as soon as possible, 
preferably within five working days. 
F. Supportive Data and Input 
1. A minimum of three informal classroom observations 
will be conducted. The plans can be discussed. 
2. Data from an informal classroom observation must be 
shared with the teacher. 
3. Work samples should be used. These include, but are 
not limited to, summaries of professional meetings 
and conferences, student grade reports, memos, 
letters, or student work samples. 
G. Summative Evaluation 
1. Written Report 
a. The summative report must be completed by 
February 15. 
b. A copy of this report shall be given to the 
teacher at least one day prior to the conference. 
c. This report and all formative data shall be 
placed in the teacher's file in the 
superintendent's office. 
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2. Conference 
a. This conference is designed to review the 
teacher's relative effectiveness of his/her 
performance on the evaluation criteria. 
b. The teacher may file a written response 
preferably within five working days. This 
response is attached to the summative evaluation 
report and included in the teacher's personnel 
file. 
3. Continuing Professional Growth Schedule Plan 
a. A minimum of one plan is written shortly after or 
in conjunction with the summative conference. 
b. The Continuing Professional Growth Schedule Plan 
will be written cooperatively by the teacher and 
the evaluator. 
c. An evaluation procedure will be included in each 
plan based on the specific criteria in the 
teacher performance evaluation system to include 
a signed written statement about the Continuing 
Professional Growth Schedule Plan. 
XI. Due Process 
A. All parties have had representation in the design, 
research, development, and review of the evaluation 
systems and instrument. Knowledge and understanding 
of performance expectations is provided for staff 
through distribution of this handbook. 
B. Every teacher is provided an opportunity for 
familiarization with the system, its procedures, and 
its use. 
C. Teachers are provided rebuttal opportunity as a part 
of each reporting cycle. 
D. All reports of unsatisfactory performance must be in 
writing and must enumerate shortcomings in a specific 
manner. 
E. Each teacher is provided access to the file of his/her 
evaluation reports located at the school site or the 
central office. 
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TEACHER PERFORMANCE INDICATOR BRIDGE 
CRITERIA 
A. DEMONSTRATES EFFECTIVE PLANNING SKILLS INCLUDING USE OF 
TIME, MATERIALS, AND RESOURCES. 
Descriptors 
1. Selects appropriate long-range goals. 
2. Selects and writes instructional objectives that are 
related to long-range goals and at the proper level of 
difficulty. 
3. Utilizes a variety of teaching methods, procedures, and 
student activities relevant and appropriate to the 
objectives. 
4. Utilizes both formative and summative evaluation 
procedures. 
5. Plans appropriate time allotment. 
6. Uses supplementary materials effectively. 
7. Blends materials and resources smoothly into a lesson. 
"Meets" Standard Indicators 
Teacher Indicators 
1. Teacher prepares lesson plans which reflect short- and 
long-term instructional objectives which can be related 
to the curriculum. 
2. Teacher maintains a seating arrangement/grouping 
appropriate for the activity and the environment. 
3. Teacher gives clear and administrative directions for 
classroom procedures or routines. 
4. Teacher structures practice activities to reinforce the 
objectives being taught. 
5. Teacher plans the necessary time frame for each lesson 
segment as displayed by smooth transitions and no loss of 
learning time. 
Student Indicators 
1. Students receive written and/or verbal information which 
explains the relevancy of short-term objectives to the 
entire course of study and/or grade level content area. 
2. Students seat themselves promptly and orderly in assigned 
groups and/or individual desks. 
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3. Students anticipate guided practice during the lesson. 
4. Students have appropriate materials prepared for the 
lesson. 
"Exceeds" Standard Indicators 
Teacher Indicators 
1. Teacher writes instructional objectives related to long-
range goals, prepared at the proper level of difficulty 
and related to purposeful activity. 
2. Teacher prepares instructional objectives which include a 
variety of teaching methods and procedures congruent with 
learning styles. 
3. Teacher plans lesson objectives through an efficient 
system of organization and structuring strategies. 
4. Teacher individualizes lesson objectives to provide for 
individual and/or learning group differences. 
5. Teacher completes task analysis for students and/or 
student groups by identifying critical learning elements, 
listing prerequisite skills, and relating student mastery 
to those skills. 
6. Teacher places students into various groups according to 
the task requirements. 
7. Teacher develops long-term, written classroom objectives 
that are diverse and individualized to achieve mastery. 
8. Teacher consistently plans activities which allow for 
review and guided practice of instructional objectives. 
9. Teacher provides opportunities for students to relate 
creative and unique experiences to complete the 
instructional objectives. 
10. Teacher uses creative techniques to involve the students 
in the review portions of the lessons. 
Student Indicators 
1. Students efficiently and consistently respond to a set 
routine when materials are collected or distributed. 
2. Students act as though they are familiar with routines 
when they move from one task/activity to another. 
3. Students understand individualized or group placement, 
know where to locate materials, and are always prepared 
when it is time to begin class. 
4. Students are attentive during the review and practice 
activity, therefore, the teacher exerts no effort to 
secure complete cooperation. 
5. Students provide either written or verbal review 
statements to the entire class which serve to reiterate 
the objectives. 
183 
APPENDIX C. 
WESTONLEE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 
184 
WESTONLEE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 
The focus of the educational program of Westonlee School 
District is the student. The District has the responsibility 
to provide a program and an environment that challenges and 
enables each student to achieve his/her potential. 
Students completing the educational program should 
exhibit the skills necessary to become a successful 
contributing citizen. 
In order to insure full personal development of students, 
a balanced comprehensive program will be provided. 
The educational program should be continually assessed to 
provide accountability toward meeting the district goals for 
students and direction for program improvement. 
DISTRICT PROGRAM GOALS 
1. Student Development of; 
-basic skills 
-learning and higher order thinking skills 
-maximum academic achievement 
-knowledge, skills, and attitudes in the humanities and 
fine arts 
-vocational skills 
-positive self-concept 
-individual skills and interests 
-acceptance of responsibility 
-an attitude of lifelong learning 
-physical fitness. 
2. High expectations for student achievement by students, 
parents, and staff. 
3. Pride in the school system and in each individual's 
accomplishments. 
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WESTONLEE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
PHILOSOPHY OF INSTRUCTION 
The most important role of the teacher in Westonlee 
School District is to provide instruction which helps each 
student reach his/her potential. Teachers shall instruct in a 
manner which encourages students to share responsibility for 
their education through active participation in the learning 
process. 
To provide direct instruction, a district curriculum will 
be established. That district curriculum shall: 
1. be in alignment with district philosophies of education 
2. assure alignment of district goals and program objectives 
3. provide for student fulfillment of graduation 
requirements 
4. provide for the scope and sequence of each course 
5. provide for continuity between grade levels and between 
appropriate courses 
6. provide for the comprehensive needs of students. 
Continuing assessment of the level of success of students 
in mastering the curriculum shall be conducted as a basis for 
change and adjustment of curriculum and instruction. 
The important elements of effective classroom instruction 
include, but need not be limited to, the following list: 
The teacher 
-teaches appropriate basic skills in each content area in 
each instructional level 
-organizes, manages, and directs the instruction 
-uses a variety of teaching methods and procedures to 
meet various student learning styles 
-continually evaluates student achievement and adapts 
instruction to meet the needs for individuals and groups 
-teaches toward mastery and fluency of the established 
curriculum 
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-uses research-based instructional methods and techniques 
-has high expectations and ideals for students and self 
-demonstrates genuine concern for students and the 
educational program 
-demonstrates accountability for teaching thé established 
program and for the success of the student 
-demonstrates professional ethical behavior 
-is knowledgeable and current in subject matter 
-creates an eagerness for learning on the part of 
students 
-encourages creativity, higher-order thinking, and 
problem solving within the framework of the curriculum 
-participates in professional growth activities. 
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WESTONLEE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
PHILOSOPHY OF EVALUATION 
The primary purpose of performance evaluation in 
Westonlee School District is to improve performance, create a 
more positive learning climate, and promote student 
achievement. Evaluation data are used to assist in making 
personnel decisions such as: 
A. promotion, performance-based pay, transfer, retention, 
release, and reduction of force 
B. identifying and recognizing individual strengths in 
performance 
C. identifying areas of performance needing improvement 
D. establishing goals for improvement 
E. planning individual and group staff development 
F. planning assistance for individuals not meeting district 
standards of performance 
Evaluation is a cooperative and ongoing process. It must 
be based on honesty, mutual trust, and confidence between the 
evaluator and the evaluatee. Both the evaluator and evaluatee 
shall be involved in monitoring and evaluating progress in 
reaching the improvement goals. Predetermined criteria, which 
trained evaluators can measure with reliability, are to be 
used to objectively measure performance. It is the 
responsibility of each evaluator to know the evaluation 
criteria, laws relating to evaluation, and the purpose and 
procedures of evaluation. The evaluator must also provide an 
opportunity for an open exchange of ideas and must demonstrate 
a fair and open-minded approach. He/she must initially and 
annually inform all staff being evaluated regarding the 
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criteria and procedures of evaluation used in the district, 
objectively collect and analyze data about performance, 
provide feedback to the evaluatee, form judgments about 
performance, and assist in performance improvement. 
It is the responsibility of the evaluatee to know the 
evaluation criteria along with the purpose and the procedures 
of evaluation, to be receptive to suggestions, to improve 
areas of weakness, and to build on areas of strong 
performance. 
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WESTONLEE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
STUDENT FEEDBACK TO TEACHERS QUESTIONNAIRE—LOWER ELEMENTARY 
0. I like the color red. 
1. My teacher makes our work interesting. 
2. My teacher is fair with all. 
3. Our teacher is often ready for class. r* 
4. My teacher tells us what new things we can 
f learn in each lesson. ^ 
5. My teacher gives us enough time to do our work 
6. My teacher knows me well. 
7. I can get help from my teacher. 
8. We go back over each lesson when we finish it. 
9. My teacher explains the lessons clearly. 
10. When I finish my work, my teacher gives me more 
work that I like to do. 
11. Our work is just right for us, not too easy nor 
too hard. ** ** 
12. My teacher makes me follow the rules. f \ 
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WESTONLEE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
STUDENT FEEDBACK TO TEACHERS OUESTIONNAIRE—UPPER ELEMENTARY 
DIRECTIONS: The statements below are designed to find out more 
about your class and teacher. This is not a test. Do not put 
your name on this paper. Please answer all the statements. 
Instructions for answering: Circle the corresponding number 
if the statement 
1. 
2 .  
3. 
4. 
5. 
does not describe your class or teacher at all; 
does not describe your class or teacher well or if 
it describes something that does not happen very 
often; 
describes your class or teacher the way it is 
sometimes; 
describes your class or teacher the way it is 
usually but not all of the time; 
describes your class or teacher the way it is almost 
all of the time. 
1. My teacher makes our work interesting. 
2. My teacher is fair with all students. 
3. Our teacher is often ready for class. 
4. My teacher tells us what new things 
we can learn in each lesson. 
5. My teacher gives us enough time to 
do our work. 
6. My teacher knows me well. 
7. I can get help from my teacher. 
8. We go back over each lesson when 
we finish it. 
9. My teacher explains the lessons 
clearly. 
10. When I finish my work, my teacher 
gives me more work that I like to do. 
11. Our work is just right for us, not 
too easy nor too hard. 
12. My teacher makes me follow the rules. 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
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WESTONLEE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
STUDENT FEEDBACK TO TEACHERS QUESTIONNAIRE—MIDDLE SCHOOL 
DIRECTIONS: The statements below are designed to find out more 
about your class and teacher. This is not a test. Do not put 
your name on this paper. Please answer all the statements. 
Instructions for answering: Circle the corresponding number 
if the statement 
1. 
2 .  
3. 
4. 
5. 
does not describe your class or teacher at all; 
does not describe your class or teacher well or if 
it describes something that does not happen very 
often; 
describes your class or teacher the way it is 
sometimes; 
describes your class or teacher the way it is 
usually but not all of the time; 
describes your class or teacher the way it is almost 
all of the time. 
1. My teacher makes class work 
interesting. 
2. My teacher is fair with all students. 
3. My teacher is well prepared for our 
class. 
4. My teacher starts lessons with 
explaining what we are going to do 
and why we are going to do it. 
5. My teacher gives enough time to 
do our work. 
6. I can talk alone with my teacher 
if I need. 
7. My teacher gives me extra help if I 
need it. 
8. When we finish a lesson we discuss 
and summarize what we have just 
studied. 
9. My teacher explains the lesson 
clearly. 
10. My teacher asks us questions in class. 
2 
2 
3 
3 
4 
4 
5 
5 
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11. My teacher explains new ideas in a 
way that is easy to understand. 
12. My teacher looks at our work, as we 
are doing it, to see if we understand 
the lesson. 
13. My teacher returns tests and homework 
quickly. 
14. If I finish an assignment before the 
class is over, my teacher gives me 
interesting work to do. 
15. My teacher doesn't waste too much time 
checking attendance, writing passes and 
handing out assignments. 
16. My teacher maintains discipline. 
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WESTONLEE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
STUDENT FEEDBACK TO TEACHERS QUESTIONNAIRE—SENIOR HIGH SCHOOL 
DIRECTIONS: The statements below are designed to find out more 
about your class and teacher. This is not a test. Do not put 
your name on this paper. Please answer all the statements. 
Instructions for answering; Circle the corresponding number 
if the statement 
1. does not describe your class or teacher at all; 
2. does not describe your class or teacher well or if 
it describes something that does not happen very 
often; 
3. describes your class or teacher the way it is 
sometimes; 
4. describes your class or teacher the way it is 
usually but not all of the time; 
5. describes your class or teacher the way it is almost 
all of the time. 
1. My teacher makes class work 
interesting. 
2. My teacher is fair with all students. 
3. My teacher is well prepared for our 
class. 
2 
2 
3 
3 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4. My teacher starts lessons with 
explaining what we are going to do 
and why we ate going to do it. 
5. My teacher gives enough time to 
do our work. 
4 5 
4 5 
6. I can talk alone with my teacher 
if I need. 
4 5 
7. My teacher gives me extra help if I 
need it. 
4 5 
8. When we finish a lesson we discuss 
and summarize what we have just 
studied. 
4 5 
9. My teacher explains the lesson 
clearly. 
10. My teacher asks questions to see if 
we understand what has been taught. 
4 5 
4 5 
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11. My teacher gives homework related to 
the subject we are studying. 
12. My teacher encourages us to look at 
problems in new ways and find new ways 
to solve problems. 
13. My teacher explains new ideas in a 
way that is easy to understand. 
14. My teacher explains how I could have 
done better work. 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
15. My teacher checks to see how well we 
understand what is being taught. 
16. My teacher knows a lot about the 
subject being taught. 
17. My teacher helps me to learn the 
subject being taught. 
18. My teacher knows what I am capable 
of doing. 
19. My teacher expects me to do the best 
work I can. 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
20. My teacher maintains discipline. 4 5 
